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We open with a stipulation and an opinion. When invited to
provide consumer psychological perspectives on Law and Econom-
ics and Rational Choice Theory, this author had no recall of having
previously heard of either of these terms. While we have acquired
some familiarity with what we understand to be the principal con-
cepts and assumptions of these intellectual thrusts, we make no
claim to having read most of the important work or being as con-
versant on these subjects as we would like. However, bounded by
what we currently do know, we opine as follows: Virtually without
exception, those familiar with the extensive scholarly empirical
literature on (individual) consumer behavior' would conclude that,
* Merchants Council Professor of Consumer Behavior, Leonard N. Stern
Graduate School of Business, New York University. The author acknowledges
with appreciation the very helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper
provided by Jon D. Hanson, Professor, Harvard Law School, Morris B. Holbrook,
the W. T. Dillard Professor of Marketing, Graduate School of Business, Columbia
University, Richard Sylla, the Henry Kaufman Professor of The History of Finan-
cial Institutions and Markets and Lawrence J. White, the Arthur E. Imperatore
Professor of Economics, the latter with the Department of Economics, Leonard N.
Stern School of Business, New York University.
1. The most rigorous scholarly literature is to be found in the Journal of Con-
sumer Research, Journal of Consumer Psychology, Journal of Marketing and Jour-
nal of Marketing Research. Other excellent sources include the Journal of Public
Policy and Marketing, the Journal of Advertising Research, and the annual edi-
tions of Advances in Consumer Research. Works summarizing the extensive litera-
ture include the various chapters on Consumer Psychology that now appear once
every three years or so in the Annual Review of Psychology. See, e.g., Jacob Jacoby
et al., Consumer Behavior: A Quadrennium, 49 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 319-44 (1998);
Jacob Jacoby et al., Consumer Psychology: A Octennium, 27 Ann. Rev. Psychol.
331-58 (1976); Thomas S. Robertson & Harold H. Kassarjian, Handbook of Con-
sumer Behavior (1991). Worthwhile introductory texts include James F. Engel et
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as proposed by those contemporary economists and legal theoreti-
cians who espouse it, Rational Choice Theory is a simplistic theory
having little correspondence with the real world of (individual)
consumer behavior.
Elaborating upon this conclusion, this paper is organized into
three sections. Our understanding of early Economic Man Theory
and its newer incarnation, Rational Choice Theory, are briefly de-
scribed in Section I, which then proceeds to discuss why we believe
that a number of the key assumptions underlying these theories
either are untenable or at least questionable. Section II examines
arguments in defense of and elucidating upon Rational Choice
Theory made by the Honorable Richard A. Posner, 2 one of those
who has spearheaded the introduction and application of this the-
ory.3 Section III concludes with some suggestions designed to as-
sist Rational Choice Theorists in acquiring deeper understanding
that should aid in bringing their theory to a new level.
The following must be emphasized, strongly, at the outset. We
understand that most economists (as well as many psychologists,
including this one) hold that the tenets of Rational Choice Theory
apply some of the time in some situations. Thus, it is important
that our critical comments not be construed as being directed or
applying to most economists, or to economists of all stripes and
persuasions. Our issue is not that the Economic Man model and
Rational Choice Theory do not work. It is that they do not work for
all markets and all consumers all of the time or in all situations.
Moreover, when they do seem to work, it is generally because they
are applied to aggregates and averages, where departures from
theory in either direction cancel each other out, potentially mask-
ing valid understanding. Human behavior, including human
al., Consumer Behavior (7th ed. 1993); Wayne D. Hoyer & Deborah J. MacInnis,
Consumer Behavior (1997); J. Paul Peter & Jerry C. Olson, Consumer Behavior
and Marketing Strategy (5th ed. 1999); Michael R. Solomon, Consumer Behavior:
Buying, Having, and Being (4th ed. 1999). For a brief overview of the history,
current foci and anticipated directions of Consumer Psychology, see Jacob Jacoby,
Consumer Psychology, in International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral
Sciences (Neil J. Smelser and B. Baltes eds., forthcoming 2001) (on file with
author).
2. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and
the Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1551 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (1990). While
the issue of rationality is discussed at several points, the reader is directed most
especially to Chapter 12, "The Economic Approach to Law."
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choice behavior, is a complex function of many known and un-
known factors. Economic variables play an important, sometimes
determinative, role in the equation. But so do psychological vari-
ables, sociological variables, cultural variables, environmental
variables, etc., and these latter factors will often override economic
considerations. And though sometimes stated strongly, our com-
ments are intended to apply only to the strong form of Rational
Choice Theory (viz., that the theory holds virtually all the time, for
virtually all people, in virtually all circumstances) being promul-
gated by some economists and members of the legal community.
Those who believe that, in this day and age, there are no such indi-
viduals may be surprised by what is cited below.
I. AN UNDERSTANDING 4 OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY
Tracing its foundation to earlier Economic Man Theory, Ra-
tional Choice Theory is a theory of decision-making and choice be-
havior often applied to marketplace (including individual
consumer) decision-making and choice behavior. In its new incar-
nation, Rational Choice Theory serves as the foundation for what
has been termed the law-and-economics movement. As we see it, a
number of key assumptions are common to both early Economic
Man and Rational Choice Theory, so that (at least to our untutored
eye) the distinctions between the two are sometimes blurred. How-
ever, for purposes of discussion, we endeavor to treat the two sepa-
rately below.
Some will no doubt hold that, in our description of Economic
Man and, to some extent, Rational Choice Theory, we have erected
some easily torched "straw men." In reply, we note the following.
First, based upon what we have learned, the positions we describe
do not seem to be straw men. While economists have developed
what they hold to be refinements to circumvent a number of the
problems noted herein, and the vast majority of economists may no
longer subscribe to all the Economic Man and Rational Choice The-
ory positions being outlined, our impression is that some propor-
tion of economists and those seeking to apply an economic
orientation in the legal arena remain committed to and continue to
4. Again, it is important to emphasize that it is this author's current
understanding, not necessarily the understanding he may arrive at upon greater
study of work in this arena.
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promulgate these positions. Ergo, these positions have legs and
life; being advocated by at least some economists, they are not
"straw men."
Second, as one economist friend5 commented: "we are more in-
terested in the predictions of our theories than whether the as-
sumptions that go into them are realistic, whatever that might
mean. If they give us good predictions, we don't care much about
the realism of the assumptions." Another commented: "I pay much
less attention to the overly restrictive assumptions and much more
to the predictions of a theory and how well these hold up and how
well they help me understand the world around me." A theme sur-
facing throughout this paper is that, while predictions (when con-
firmed via correlational research paradigms) may suggest
understanding, they may actually be providing only the illusion of
understanding. The ancients predicted the seasons and (believing
a sacrificed virgin would appease the gods, thereby causing the
seasons to re-emerge) sacrificed virgins to assure their coming-and
come they did, but not because of any valid understanding of appli-
cable causal factors. Similarly, one might predict that all those
who eat bread will die. While this prediction can be confirmed
100% of the time, virtually everyone understands that the hypoth-
esis "eating bread eventually causes death" is poppycock. Unfortu-
nately, in other instances-such as when one formulates a
sophisticated causal model then, relying upon correlational analy-
ses, a pattern of findings emerge that are consistent with the pre-
dictions (thereby leading one to claim that the theory is
confirmed)-it is not as easy to recognize or accept that our causal
theory may be nothing other than poppycock.
While predictions predicated upon correlational data might be
comforting and even useful, the ineluctable fact is that they cannot
be relied upon as confirming that we have a valid understanding
(qua explanation) of causal relationships. Indeed, sometimes they
actually mask such relationships. Particularly in those instances
where a theory posits causal explanations for its phenomena, the
validity and tenability of the theory's underlying assumptions al-
ways merit serious evaluation. Absent such, there can be no claim
to being scientific.
5. We hope our economist friends remain friends, given that we will be citing
and addressing remarks, though stated unequivocally, were not necessarily in-
tended for wider dissemination.
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Another reason for adumbrating positions as we have stems
from a consideration of the potential audience for this paper.
Those with background in economics will be able to interpolate
where economics has advanced beyond the positions articulated
here. On the other hand, others (e.g., law students entering from
non-business disciplines, students in psychology, etc.) will arrive
with little or no prior grounding in economics. For such readers,
this paper may be seen as a primer on historical positions. Analo-
gous to the manner by which most ski students are initially taught
how to turn, slow down and come to a stop (by the very inefficient
"snowplowing" technique) and only later taught to execute these
actions through parallel skiing, we believe that the student who
understands the positions as described here will be better able to
build upon and revise these understandings in the future. Relat-
edly, describing the early economists' positions in their extreme
form-a form still held by some-makes it easier to see the counter-
point offered by the behavioral approach.
A final reason for describing things as we do will become obvi-
ous after reading the Mea Culpa coda sub-section near the end of
this paper. Given these caveats, we turn to the task at hand.
A. Early "Economic Man" Theory and its Predictions
According to some early economic theorists (e.g., Adam Smith,
Jeremy Bentham, Alfred Marshall), man's/woman's desire for
goods and services exceed his/her6 ability to pay. Therefore, buy-
ing decisions are made through a rational process during which we
assign a value to each desired product or service offering based
upon our assessment of the ability of that offering to satisfy our
needs and desires. This want satisfying ability is termed "utility."
As different offerings possess different levels of utility, rational be-
havior dictates that one seek to maximize utility. In contemporary
parlance, this means seeking the most bang for the buck.
When it came to explaining and predicting consumer behavior,
early economists believed that the costlprice of the offering was the
key element in the utility maximization equation. Raising an of-
fering's price was predicted to lower its sales; lowering its price
would increase sales. This seemingly common-sensical proposition
6. Henceforth, we use gender distinctions randomly when the intent is to re-
fer to both males and females alike.
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suggests that, given changes in price, consumers respond like bil-
liard balls, buying when prices are lowered and refraining when
prices rise. Just like cue balls, consumers will proceed along the
path dictated by these external (in this case, economic) forces. To
do otherwise would represent an anomaly.7 As described, this view
represents little more than a simple input-output model, where
price changes represent the input and purchase/non-purchase rep-
resents the output.
When it comes to Rational Choice Theory, little appears to
have changed. The assumption that lowering the price provides
"the only reasonable explanation" for increased sales finds common
expression in the writings of contemporary Rational Choice Theo-
rists. Consider Judge Posner's assertion that: "Buyers do not
choose randomly. Rationality is the only reasonable explanation
for their reactions to changes in relative prices."s As counterpoint,
consider how the general behavioral science model treats consumer
response to changes in price.
B. The General Behavioral Science Model and its Predictions
Regardless of discipline or orientation, most behavioral sci-
ences operate according to some form of a Stimulus-Organism-Re-
sponse (S-O-R) model-essentially, an input-output model with the
important distinction of having the mind of the individual inter-
7. Not surprisingly, more recent economic thought serving as the wellspring
for Rational Choice Theory also contains a cue-ball analogy, albeit of a different
spin. As Duxbury writes:
Despite the bounded nature of economic reality, he [Milton Friedman]
suggests it is reasonable to assume that business firms behave as if they
are seeking rationality to maximize their profits and as if they are fully
aware of the information necessary to succeed in this endeavor. Friedman
attempts to demonstrate his proposition by offering the analogy of the ex-
pert billiard player:
It seems not at all unreasonable that excellent predictions would be
yielded by the hypothesis that the billiard player made his shots as if he
knew the complicated mathematical formulas that would give the opti-
mum directions of travel, could estimate accurately by eye the angles, etc.,
describing the location of balls, could make lightening calculations from
the formulas, and could then make the balls travel in the directions indi-
cated by the formulas.
Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence 371 (1995) (quoting Milton
Friedman, The Rationality of Positive Economics, in Essays in Positive Economics
3, 21 (1953)). Unfortunately, there are few true experts in any field, billiards in-
cluded. So where does this leave the rest of us?
8. Posner, supra note 2, at 1556.
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vening between the input and the output (see Figure 1). The exter-
nal factors impinging upon the individual (including price and
price changes, but also word-of-mouth conversations, the influence
of packaging, advertising, the "atmospherics" of the retail environ-
ment,9 etc.) are termed stimuli, the individual is termed the organ-
ism, and the output (which includes but is not limited to purchase
or even to overtly observable behavior) is termed the response. All
or virtually all the concepts and variables that populate social sci-
ence theory can be classified as being either stimulus factors, orga-
nismic factors or response factors. 10 Some fundamental insights
derived from research on the general behavioral science model are
as follows.
As telegraphed above, the objective external world contains a
myriad of potentially influential stimuli beyond price or financial
considerations. However, regardless of their number and inten-
sity, all that enters into the consumer's decision-making is the con-
sumer's subjective interpretation of (one or more of) these external
stimuli. Unlike cue balls or other physical matter, human beings
have minds. When evaluating and reacting to incoming informa-
tion, a wide variety of psychological factors come into play. Among
others, these include the person's past experiences, current expec-
tations, motives, mood, personality, attitudes, values, beliefs,
memory, etc.
Thus, because of differences in their experiences and mental
contents, individuals often differ in the ways in which they evalu-
ate the stimuli impinging from the external world. What this
means is two highly rational beings may assign different interpre-
tations to the very same incoming stimulus information. A few
simplistic illustrations should suffice to illustrate these points.
Consider the interpretations that different observers may assign to
the same set of vertical parallel lines. If asked "What number does
this represent?," most would interpret this physical stimulus as
representing the number eleven. On the other hand, someone ac-
customed to working with antiquities or signed and numbered lith-
ographic prints might interpret this same objective stimulus as
representing the Roman number two. Someone else conversant
9. See Special Issue: Retail Atmospherics, 49 J. Bus. Res. (2000).
10. See, e.g., Jacob Jacoby, Stimulus-Organism-Response Reconsidered: An
Evolutionary Step In Modeling (Consumer) Behavior, J. Consumer Psychol. (forth-
coming) (manuscript on file with author).
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with the binary system used in computers might interpret two
ones in parallel as representing the binary number four (where 00
= 1, 01 = 2, 10 = 3 and 11 = 4). These interpretations apply not
only to how the world is perceived and interpreted, but also to how
it is remembered. Upon seeing a bottle of wine priced at $7.99,
while forgetting the actual price, one person may later remember it
as being a "cheap" bottle of wine while another might remember it
as being an "expensive" bottle of wine.
The point is that the external, physical, objective environment
is always being interpreted in terms of what the individual already
knows. It is not objective reality, but psychologically perceived re-
ality that determines how we interpret and, as a consequence, re-
act to the world about us.
From the perspective of the behavioral sciences, while Eco-
nomic Man Theory may apply across some to-be-defined aggregate,
it falls apart when considering individual consumer behavior. This
is because an item's cost is only one of many factors that impinge
upon and influence the individual's decision-making and behavior.
In any given instance, the individual may deem one or more of
these other factors (e.g., a spouse's opinion or even the opinion of a
seemingly well- informed stranger one has just met in the store) to
be more important than the item's cost.
Recall that, according to Economic Man Theory, lowering the
cost of an item leads to a single prediction, namely, an increase in
sales. In contrast, the behavioral science model suggests consum-
ers (with a need or desire for the offering in question) may react to
lowered price in various ways, some of which lead to purchase,
many others of which do not. Clearly, some individuals will be-
have as predicted by Economic Man Theory, namely, given a re-
duced price, they will be encouraged to make a purchase. Others
also may make a purchase, but for reasons having nothing to do
with the price reduction. Indeed, some may not notice nor under-
stand that the price has been lowered. Others may notice, but not
care and would have bought the item even at its pre-markdown
price. It would be erroneous to consider such purchases as predic-
tions that confirm Economic Man Theory.
In point of fact, a greater number of scenarios may be envi-
sioned under which a price reduction would not lead to purchase or
increased purchase. As before, the consumer may not perceive
that a reduction has taken place. Or, recognizing there has been a
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price reduction, the consumer may consider the amount of the re-
duction (e.g., from $13.99 to $13.95 or even $12.95) inconsequential
and not worth a response. Even if the consumer believes the re-
duction is consequential (e.g., from $13.99 to $9.99), he may think,
perhaps erroneously, that another price reduction was likely to be
forthcoming and decide to hold off buying (and, as a consequence,
perhaps miss the opportunity to make the purchase at a future
time). Who among us has not at one time or another experienced
this with regard to a Wall Street security that had dipped in price,
then turned around earlier than anticipated, thereby causing us to
miss buying in as it began its upward trajectory?
As economists have come to recognize, the lowering of price
might be interpreted in a variety of other ways that also lead to
non-purchase." Examples include: as a (highly fallible) signal of
lower quality;12 as a signal that the item no longer has the cachet
or snob appeal it once had;13 as a signal that the item was going to
be discontinued and replaced by a more advanced model (so that
the sale model may now possess lesser value); etc. In another in-
stance, though the consumer may very much want that particular
item, she may deem the manufacturer to be socially irresponsible
(e.g., perhaps due to its environmental policies, discriminatory hir-
ing practices, etc.) and decide not to purchase for those rea-
sons-reasons having nothing at all to do with economic factors.
As yet another example, though she may have coveted the
item for a long time and think that the price reduction makes it a
11. Economists use the term Giffen goods to apply to such situations. Since
different people react differently to lowered prices on different offerings, perhaps it
is not "Giffen goods" as much as it may be "Giffen people" that account for the
observed effect.
12. See generally Jacob Jacoby et al., Price, Brand Name and Product Compo-
sition Characteristics as Determinants of Perceived Quality, 55 J. Applied Psychol.
570 (1971) (discussing price as a signal of quality); Jacob Jacoby et al., Experience
and Expertise in Complex Decision Making, 13 Advances Consumer Res. 469
(1986) (showing that inexperienced consumers will rely upon price to arrive at
judgments of quality while more expert consumers tend to rely on other more diag-
nostic and predictive information).
13. Discussing why luxury items, such as Rolls Royce cars, Rolex watches and
Lalique crystal may sell worse at lower prices than at higher ones, Eric N.
Berkowitz et al. write: "The recent success of Swiss watchmaker TAG is an exam-
ple. The company raised the average price of its watches from $250 to $1,000 and
its sales volume increased sevenfold!" Eric N. Berkowitz et al., Marketing 388 (6th
ed. 2000). Given that the watches did not change in any material respect, how can
Rational Choice Theory explain such phenomena?
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genuine bargain, if she expects to be earning less money in the fu-
ture, she may decide to forgo purchasing the item. Regarding ex-
pectations, one of our economist friends wrote: "We can also model
expectations and incorporate them into our choice models; the
point about someone holding off buying in the expectation of a fur-
ther price reduction is no problem for us." Questioning the utility
of such modeling, Katona wrote:
Some [economic] scholars who acknowledge the importance of
expectations argue that subjective data are not needed be-
cause readily available objective data may serve as proxies
for the expectations. Economists frequently assume that ex-
pectations originate in recent past changes (of prices, or in-
come, or interest rates) and therefore they extrapolate the
past data into the future. But recent changes are just one
among a variety of factors which form the basis of expecta-
tions and which differ from time to time. Thus, to refer only
to some fairly obvious instances, inflationary expectations
have arisen in periods of price stability and failed to be exces-
sive following large price increases. Notions about what the
government will or will not do often influence price expecta-
tions more than past price trends do. There is no way to
avoid measuring expectations directly because only after
knowing what they are can the factors determining them be
unraveled.
The "proxy theory" is an example of a mechanistic psy-
chology which is unacceptable because human beings are ca-
pable of learning.14
Not only do current expectations often have a decisive influence on
purchase decisions and behavior, past experience (i.e., learning)
can be similarly decisive. Regardless of how much the price is re-
duced, having previously purchased a product (or brand of a prod-
uct) only to have it prove highly unsatisfactory, the consumer may
decide never to purchase that item again.
Stated somewhat differently, while the early economists pre-
ferred to "explain" outcomes by correlating them with inputs (anal-
ogous to telling the mechanic "If this dashboard knob is turned to
the right, almost without exception, you get this funny noise under
14. George Katona, Psychology and Consumer Economics, 1 J. Consumer Res.
1, 7-8 (1974) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Katona I]. See also George Katona,
Psychol. Econ. 177-226 (1975) (discussing psychological principles of consumer be-
havior) [hereinafter Katona II].
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the hood"), most other behavioral scientists recognize one has to
look under the hood to attain understanding of what is causing
that output. This latter approach is in greater correspondence
with that employed in the physical and biological sciences. As but
one of countless consumer behavior examples that might be cited,
although the output (brand-specific purchase behavior) may ap-
pear the same on the surface, research shows that "brand loyalty"
and "repeat purchasing behavior" are a function of entirely differ-
ent causal dynamics.15 This has important, not to be ignored, im-
plications when seeking either to generate or change brand loyal
behavior.
C. Assumptions Underlying Early Economic Theory16
A number of factors explain why the early economic models
were highly flawed conceptualizations of consumer behavior.
From the perspective of "behavioral man," these may be organized
into three categories: those having to do with (1) the stimulus envi-
ronment, (2) the organism and (3) the response.
Assumptions Pertaining to the Stimulus
As previously discussed, the early economic models focused
primarily on economic (price and cost) factors, essentially assum-
ing that these were the only factors that mattered. As such, these
models failed to incorporate a vast array of other important non-
economic externalities that can and often do supercede economic
considerations. Thus, perhaps but 5% of the attention of consumer
behavior scholars is devoted to studying economic factors. Con-
15. See Jacob Jacoby & David B. Kyner, Brand Loyalty vs. Repeat Purchasing
Behavior, 10 J. Marketing Research 1 (1973).
16. As we are new to this intellectual arena and our observations seem so
obvious and fundamental, it is likely we will be expressing points previously made
by others. This has both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, as
proper scholarship requires acknowledging the prior contributions of others, this
writer is dismayed at being unable to do so in this instance. (For example, within
a few days of the due date of this manuscript, this writer learned of a number of
other item he absolutely "should read." Many sounded directly relevant, including
one by Robert Shiller with the engaging title "Irrational Exuberance.") On the
other hand, not influenced by these writings, it is possible that these naive eyes
(coupled with a sometimes rambling style) may see and express something that
has not been recognized nor expressed before.
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temporary texts on consumer behavior 17 devote relatively few
paragraphs to cost considerations; instead, virtually all the atten-
tion is devoted to psychological and sociological considerations.
Assumptions Pertaining to the Organism
One obvious limitation is that, unlike cue balls, all organisms
are not the same. There are six billion souls on this earth. As no
two have the same set of fingerprints, imagine how unique their
minds must be. Nor do we come to the table with the same finan-
cial resources. Some of us have more income or accumulated
wealth (and accumulated debt) than others, and factors such as
these will influence how we react to the same external stimulus
(e.g., a price change). Consumers with comparable levels of in-
come, accumulated wealth and accumulated debt can be expected
to react differently to the same external stimulus.
More importantly (and perhaps because at the time they were
formulated, the other behavioral sciences either were non-existent
or poorly defined), early Economic Man theories completely ig-
nored the nuts and bolts of human psychology. Although a limited
number of assumptions regarding the consumer were incorporated,
these assumptions were seriously flawed. Probably the most fun-
damental of these was the assumption that human beings always
seek to rationally behave. For most of us, a moment's introspec-
tion should reveal that this assumption could not possibly be cor-
rect. First, we all do things that, to others (and sometimes to
ourselves as well), we know to be irrational. Second, since Socratic
times we have known that there are both rational and emotional
bases for our behavior. The early economic models appear to as-
sume that emotional considerations are neither relevant nor im-
portant. As the work summarized by Slovic18 illustrates, this
assumption is untenable.
Assigning a value to each desired offering based upon an as-
sessment of the ability of that offering to satisfy our needs and
desires necessarily presumes that, at the time we make a purchase
17. See, e.g., Peter & Olson, supra note 1; Hoyer & MacInnis, supra note 1;
Solomon, supra note 1.
18. See Paul Slovic, Rational Actors and Rational Fools: The Influence of Af-
fect on Judgment and Decision-Making, 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 163; Joel B.
Cohen & Charles S. Areni, Affect and Consumer Behavior in Roberston & Kassar-
jian, supra note 1, at 191.
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decision: (a) we have complete and accurate knowledge of (all) our
wants and desires, (b) we have complete and accurate knowledge of
the available offerings, and (c) we posses the ability to adequately
evaluate the offerings at issue. Again, introspection should reveal
that, at any given moment in time, it is virtually impossible for us
to identify, keep in mind and factor into our mental equation all
our short term and long term wants and desires. It is also close to
impossible to have knowledge of all the options in many contempo-
rary product categories. Further, in this era of esoteric bio-chemi-
cal ingredients and highly complex consumer products, few
consumers have the ability to adequately evaluate the labeling in-
formation provided for many consumer products. Yet if we cannot
identify and keep in mind all our wants and desires, and if we can-
not identify all the available offerings, or adequately evaluate in-
formation regarding the offerings being considered for purchase, is
it rational to expect us always to behave in terms of some external
criterion of rationally?
While early economic models did make reference to the indi-
vidual's needs, wants and desires (concepts that these days are
generally subsumed under the rubric "motivation"), essentially,
they assumed these were the only important intra-psychic factors
that needed to be considered. Completely ignored was the fact that
the objective external reality does not govern consumer behavior.
Rather, the external reality that enters into their minds and deci-
sions has been filtered, perceived and interpreted. As a conse-
quence, it is subjective internal reality that determines human
behavior, including consumer behavior. The internal factors that
need to be considered go well beyond needs, wants and desires.
They are many in number and highly complex.
Early economic theories often seemed to assume that the con-
sumer's needs and wants remained invariant over time so that,
given the same set of economic inputs at different points in time,
the consumer would respond comparably at these different points
in time. Yet the consumer's needs and wants change over time (see
Figure 1). Generally, a satisfied need no longer serves as a mo-
tivator of behavior. Satisfying one's hunger by consuming a
twenty-four ounce steak at noon does not mean that that same per-
son will be inclined to consume another twenty-four ounce steak at
12:15 p.m. that same day, no matter how much the price is re-
duced. Since economists, through notions such as elasticity per
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unit of time, hold that they can incorporate these changing evalua-
tions and expectations into their models, some will consider this
example silly. However, our leitmotif is that prediction predicated
upon correlational analysis, though comforting, is not necessarily
the equivalent of explanation (qua an understanding of the under-
lying causal dynamics). For this reason, we find more compelling
the counter-argument and data adduced by Katona. 19
Because it lays the foundation for our later criticizing the "be-
havioral" orientation championed by some prominent Rational
Choice Theorists,20 it is worthwhile digressing to consider some of
the many ways in which needs, wants and desires (qua motives)
interact with actual behavior. As summarized in Figure 2, rarely
is behavior a function of a single dominant motive. More often, it
is a function of several (frequently competing) motives. Further,
the same motive can easily lead to completely different behaviors
across different individuals (e.g., an oral aggressive need can be
expressed by one person via eating foods that require hard chew-
ing, by another person via becoming a professional movie critic and
by a third person who becomes a scatological comedian) and within
the same individual over time. Just as easily, different motives
can be manifested via the same behavior. Consider three different
souls who regularly attend Sunday church services. One may do so
because he strongly believes in god. A second may do so because
he strongly wishes to avoid his wife's ire were he not to attend ser-
vices. A third may do so for social or business reasons (e.g., it's
good for his rural hardware business for him to be seen as a god-
fearing man). Further complicating the picture is the fact that be-
havior is determined by more than motives (see Figure 1). Many
other factors both internal and external to the individual will influ-
ence and often determine the individual's behavior.
The early economic models also ignored the fact that purchase
decisions often involve a compromise between two or more consum-
ers (e.g., between a husband and wife who may not share the same
values), so that the resultant choice may have little to do with each
individual's preferences. Again, this severely limited the explana-
tory or predictive power of the early models. As one of our col-
leagues commented: "The husband-wife disagreements are no
19. See Katona I, supra note 14.
20. See Posner, supra note 3, at 169.
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problem for us-we just define the household as the consuming unit
and model its choices." Again, while possibly adequate for predic-
tion, it is debatable whether this approach yields genuine under-
standing. Further, what happens when the teenage son, a
household member, purchases something that neither parent
needs or desires? Under what conditions does it make sense (i.e.,
what are the objective criteria for determining when) to switch
from modeling the individual household member to modeling the
household, and vice versa?21
The early economic models focussed on aggregate behavior, es-
sentially assuming that the individual members of the defined pop-
ulation all behave as the average member of that population; thus,
for all intents and purposes, one may treat the population as being
homogeneous. This assumption also surfaces in contemporary Ra-
tional Choice Theory and is discussed in Section II below.
Assumptions Pertaining to the Response
Contemporary marketplace realities also create difficulties for
the ability of early economic models to make specific outcome pre-
dictions. Never in all recorded history have consumers had such
high levels of discretionary income. Never in all recorded history
have consumers confronted an environment that contained such
variety in choice. Let us accept for the moment that, at least some-
times, economic models can predict aggregate demand regarding a
product category. However, especially when each offering pos-
sesses so many different desirable features and options, being able
to predict the approximate number of automobiles (or phones, or
computers, etc.) consumers will buy during a given year does not
enable one to predict just which make of car (phone, computer, etc.)
consumers would select. Yet when it comes to issues such as prod-
uct liability, is not the focus on specific brands or models, not on
the generic product itself?22
21. For a summary and critique of the conventional economic approach for
treating the household as an economic agent, see Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue,
The Cost of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation,
107 Yale L. J. 1163, 1237-38 (1998). See also, e.g., Barbara R. Bergmann, Becker's
Theory of the Family: Preposterous Conclusions, 1 Feminist Econ. 141 (1996) (argu-
ing that Becker ignores intra-familial dynamics and power disparities).
22. Rational Choice Theorists sometimes write as if the distinction between
product choice and brand choice is inconsequential. For example, Judge Posner
writes:
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The situation has been summarized thusly:
Econometric studies are still commonly restricted to an anal-
ysis of interrelations among aggregate data that reflect past
activities such as consumer expenditures, business invest-
ments, incomes, and profits. Correlation among data on re-
sults of behavior are deemed preferable to a consideration of
the allegedly elusive psychological factors which behavioral
economics postulates between stimuli, such as changes in the
environment or information transmitted, and spending or
savings decisions. 23
In terms of the S->O->R formulation, Katona (virtually a
voice in the wilderness during the 1950s, '60s and '70s) was point-
ing out that traditional economists prefer to work with S->R or
R1->R 2 relationships, rather than with S->O->R relation-
ships.24 In that same article, Katona adduces evidence (regarding
inflation and consumer spending, personal savings in prosperity
and recession, wealth and saving, and saturation with consumer
goods) revealing the inadequacy of such thinking.25
We understand that most contemporary economists do not
subscribe to strong forms of the Economic Man assumptions, ac-
cepting that these assumptions represent general tendencies and
apply in some instances but not others. Yet many of the assump-
tions underlying classical Economic Man Theory also surface in
Rational Choice Theory, to which attention is now directed.
D. "Rational Choice Theory:" Economic Man Redux
"Law-and-economics applies the basic assumption of econom-
ics-that people will try to get the most out of what they have (are
Moreover, the fact that people are not always rational, even that some are
irrational most or all of the time, is not in itself a challenge to rational-
choice economics. Many people have an irrational fear of flying .... But
their irrationality does not invalidate the economic analysis of transporta-
tion, although it may show why pecuniary and time costs, and accident
rates, may not explain the entire difference between the demand for air
transportation and the demand for its substitutes.
Posner, supra note 2, at 1554. Choosing to use air versus some other form of trans-
portation is not usually the issue in product liability matters. Rather, it is choos-
ing one air carrier (or one type of aircraft, or one route, or one particular airport
(JFK rather than LaGuardia, etc.)) rather than another.




'rational maximizers')--to law."28 Rational maximization, in turn,
may be defined as seeking "wealth/profit maximization" and "cost
minimization."27 The conceptual core of law and economics is Ra-
tional Choice Theory, which evolved at and remains strongly iden-
tified with the University of Chicago and those who studied there.
Rational Choice Theory has been described as follows:
[Ilt is useful first to understand the defining features of law
and economics.... [Tihis approach to the law posits that le-
gal rules are best analyzed and understood in light of stan-
dard economic principles. Gary Becker offers a typical
account of those principles: "[Alll human behavior can be
viewed as involving participants who [11 maximize their util-
ity [21 from a stable set of preferences and [31 accumulate an
optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety
of markets." The task of law and economics is to determine
the implications of such rational maximizing behavior in and
out of markets, and its legal implications for markets and
other institutions .... [This] general approach underlies a
wide range of work in the economic analysis of the law. 28
In similar fashion, Judge Posner writes: "The basic assumption of
economics that guides the version of economic analysis of law that
I shall be presenting is that people are rational maximizers of their
satisfactions-all people (with the exception of small children and
the profoundly retarded) in all of their activities (except when
under the influence of psychosis or similarly deranged though drug
or alcohol abuse) that involve choice."29 As exemplified by his writ-
ings,30 Judge Posner is a champion of the scientific approach and
its greater use in jurisprudence. Yet according to the philosophers
of science, such certainty (as is reflected in the assertion "all people
26. Mark Tushnet, Idols of the Right: The "Law-and-Economics" Movement,
Dissent, Fall 1993, at 477.
27. Although the concepts of "profit" and "cost" may initially have been con-
fined to financial considerations, as we understand it, Rational Choice Theorists
now apply these notions to psychological phenomena and processes; e.g., ego en-
hancement vs. ego costs.
28. Christine Jolls et al., Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1476 (1998) (quoting Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach
to Human Behavior 14 (1976) (footnote omitted)). Having devoted thirty-five years
to studying the richness and complexity of consumer behavior, the present writer
is impressed to learn that three incredibly simple propositions are all one needs to
understand "all human behavior."
29. Posner, supra note 3, at 353.
30. See id. at 7, 26, 62-70, 83, 213-14.
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... in all their activities") is fundamentally incompatible with the
scientific perspective, where one is taught to suspend certainty be-
cause one can never tell if one has accounted for all the relevant
information. 3 ' It is also incompatible with Bertrand Russell's elo-
quent defense of philosophy32 that Judge Posner advises "is worth
pondering,"33 as well as with the dicta of a distinguished jurist.34
We agree with Judge Posner when he brings these points to the
fore.
With its recognition that the consumer is not a cue ball, but an
information processing decision-maker, and its corresponding em-
phasis on supplying the consumer with information beyond price
information, Rational Choice Theory represents improvement over
the earlier Economic Man Theory. However, because it continues
to ignore the vast body of relevant scholarly thought and empirical
findings on human psychology in general and consumer behavior
in particular, Rational Choice Theory remains uninformed and un-
able to recognize that many of its key assumptions are unverifiable
and/or untenable.
E. Assumptions Underlying Rational Choice Theory
Implicit in Rational Choice Theory are a number of key as-
sumptions.3 5 Among these are: (1) objective criteria exist that en-
able one to differentiate rational from irrational; (2) the differences
between organizational behavior and individual (consumer) behav-
31. It is worth emphasizing that our objection throughout is to the strong form
of Rational Choice Theory, namely, the version that holds it applies to all people in
all situations involving choice. We have little problem with those Rational Choice
Theorists and other economists who hold that Rational Choice Theory holds some
of the time in some situations.
32. Bertrand Russell wrote:
Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the true an-
swer.., is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts
and free them from... tyranny .... Thus, while diminishing our feeling
of certainty as to what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge of
what they may be[.]
Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy 157 (1912).
33. Posner, supra note 3, at 4.
34. See Posner, supra note 3, at 192 (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural
Law, 32 Harvard L. Rev. 40 (1918)).
35. We understand that a number of our criticisms of Rational Choice Theory
have at one time or another been offered by others. Regrettably, our lack of famili-
arity with this literature prevents us from giving due credit to or even acknowledg-
ing these earlier contributors.
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ior are negligible; (3) consumer behavior is predicated upon con-
sciously considered factors; (4) consumer behavior is predicated
solely upon rational considerations; (5) consumers make their
choices from among "a stable set of preferences;" (6) consumers al-
ways seek to maximize utility (7) in maximizing utility, consumers
consider the risks involved; (8) when not presumed, satisfaction
can easily be assessed; and (9) information provision will translate
into information impact.
1. Objective criteria exist to differentiate what is rational from
what is irrational
For one to contend that a given decision or behavior was irra-
tional, one would first need to have some criterion of what was and
what was not rational. Thus, a critical assumption underlying Ra-
tional Choice Theory is that widely agreed upon, objectively verifi-
able criteria exist that enable one to differentiate rational from
irrational. Without such objective criteria (or a workable, opera-
tionalizable definition of rationality), it becomes impossible for an-
yone to determine just what is and what is not rational. Yet, we
know of no such criterion or set of criteria. As a consequence, the
scientific foundation of Rational Choice Theory becomes suspect.
The problem is compounded by the fact that different theorists
appear to propound their own, somewhat varying definitions of ra-
tionality.36 Rational Choice Theory thus appears to be more a con-
ceptual orientation than a formal, well-developed theory. Since
what is rational needs to be determined by comparing the entity's
decision or behavior to some objective model, criterion or authority,
how does one proceed when the different models, criteria or au-
thorities disagree? Would it not prove troublesome for Rational
Choice Theory when an individual's behavior judged to be rational
according to one model, criterion or authority, is judged to be irra-
tional by another model, criterion or authority?37 And though fish-
36. The discipline of physics appears to serve as an aspirational model for
some Rational Choice Theorists. For this reason, it pays to consider Einstein's
E=MC2, where the definition of each of the equation's terms does not vary across
physicists. In referring to behavioral economics, Judge Posner writes: "The nebu-
lousness of their ruling concept gives rise to all sorts of questions." Posner, supra
note 2, at 1559. Most assuredly, the same can be said with respect to Rational
Choice Theory's ruling concept of rationality.
37. It is not surprising to see Judge Posner comment: "We now know that if we
give a difficult legal question to two equally distinguished [and, presumably,
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ermen may serve as a source of inspiration,38 the absence of a
standard is reminiscent of the story of the one-armed fisherman
who held up his one hand to illustrate having "caught a fish this
long."
As Judge Posner notes: "Karl Popper, whose philosophy has
been highly influential in economics, claimed that falsifiability was
an essential feature of any useful scientific theory. If a theory can-
not be falsified, neither it nor its predictions can be validated, for
everything that happens is by definition consistent with the the-
ory."39 In the absence of any universally accepted and agreed upon
standard for determining what constitutes rational decision-mak-
ing and behavior, does not Rational Choice Theory reduce to a the-
ory that cannot be falsified? At the very least, "A theory that is not
effectively falsifiable, but only confirmable, is tenuously
grounded."4° Confirmation predicated upon prediction, when both
the predictor and criterion (or independent and dependent) vari-
ables are not under the control of the researcher, represents a
weak form of scientific confirmation. 41
2. The differences between organizational behavior and
individual consumer behavior are negligible
Alchian held that economic competition of firms resembled a
Darwinian process such that the ability of businesses to survive
depended upon their ability to operate at lower costs and maxi-
mized profits relative to their competitors.42 In like fashion, Fried-
man held that one could assume businesses pursued a strategy of
profit maximization since, "unless the behavior of businessmen in
some way or other approximated behavior consistent with the
maximization of returns, it seems unlikely that they would remain
in business for long."43 Although it is debatable whether profit
equally rational] legal thinkers, chosen at random, we may well get opposite an-
swers." Posner, supra note 3, at 428. Is such an outcome rational?
38. See Posner, supra note 3, at xii.
39. Posner, supra note 2, at 1551, 1560.
40. Posner, supra note 3 at 365.
41. See generally Thomas D. Cook & Donald T. Campbell, Quasi-Experimen-
tation: Design & Analysis Issues for Field Settings 7-9 (1979) (analyzing scientific
research techniques and strategies for assessing causal propositions).
42. See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory 25
Evolutionary Econ. 65 (1993).
43. Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Essays in
Positive Economics 3, 22 (1953).
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maximization (as opposed to "reasonable profits consistent with so-
cial responsibility") is the principal goal of all for-profit organiza-
tions, it is questionable whether individuals can be assumed to
always abide by this same profit maximization objective." What
applies to firms and other organizations-where cadres of highly
educated, professional managers and Boards of Directors are paid
large sums to focus on making rational decisions-may not apply,
or apply in the same way, to the individual consumer.
3. Consumer behavior is predicated upon consciously considered
factors45
To this writer, rationality implies decision-making that is a
function of the deliberate conscious consideration and evaluation of
information. However, consistent with Polyani's speculations re-
garding "tacit knowledge," a considerable amount of research over
the past two decades reveals that much, perhaps most, human be-
havior is controlled by unconscious, not conscious factors. 46 As op-
posed to being a function of conscious reflection, most psychological
phenomena are essentially automatic and subconscious in na-
ture.47 That is, much of what goes on when one perceives, inter-
prets and responds to information occurs without our ever being
consciously aware of our mental processes or behavior. Indeed, "[a]
44. As an example of the tendency for Rational Choice Theorists to equate
businessmen with consumers, consider Judge Posner's comment: "this definition
[of Rational Choice Theory] embraces... the usual economic actors, such as busi-
nessmen and consumers[.]" Posner, supra note 3, at 353-54.
45. Judge Posner writes: "Rational choice need not be conscious choice."
Posner, supra note 2, at 1551. Posner also writes that "decisions, to be rational,
need not be conscious." Posner, supra note 3, at 354. It is uncertain whether all
Rational Choice Theorists would concur. Judge Posner's views on this topic are
discussed infra in Section II.
46. See Michael Polanyi "The Logic of Tacit Inference," in Knowing and Being:
Essays by Michael Polanyi 138 (Marjorie Grene ed., 1969); Michael Polanyi &
Harry Prosch, Meaning 46-65 (1975).
47. See John A. Bargh, The Automaticity of Everyday Life, in The Automatic-
ity of Everyday Life: Advances in Social Cognition 1 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. ed., 1997);
Antonio R. Demasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain
(G.P. Putnam & Sons 1994); J.A. Hobson, Consciousness (1999); Larry L. Jacoby &
L.R. Brooks, Nonanalytic Cognition: Memory, Perception and Concept Learning, in
The Psychology of Learning and Motivation: Advances in Research and Theory
(Gordon Bower ed., 1984); Larry L. Jacoby et al., Unconscious Influences Revealed:
Attention, Awareness and Control, 47 Am. Psychologist 802 (1992). See generally
Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works 36-42 (1997) (discussing examples of behav-
iors that occur without thought or reflection).
2000]
104 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:81
synthesis of research on consumers' pre-purchase behavior sug-
gests that a substantial proportion of choices does not involve deci-
sion-making, not even on the first purchase."48
Consumers purchase goods for more than their functional
value; many acquire goods for their symbolic value. After all, a
Rolex is but a watch and a number of other timepieces, at consider-
ably lesser cost but without the same panache, possess the same
objective features. Further, much of the informational content
that reaches consciousness has multiple meanings, with some of
these meanings exerting their effect, through symbolism or meta-
phorical allusion, at less than conscious levels. Innumerable ex-
amples could be provided. One that was quite memorable is a
magazine advertisement, now three decades old, that appeared
when cigarette manufacturers began introducing their product in
crush-resistant cardboard packaging. The full-page ad was a pho-
tograph showing a man sitting on a beach chair on an isolated
beach, with a very attractive woman walking from water's edge to-
ward the man holding a pack of Winston cigarettes. The headline
read: "Winston brings you the box." This ad communicates various
messages, some explicit (Winston is available in a crush-proof box)
and immediately obvious, others implicit (symbolic) and not neces-
sarily obvious either to the reader or the creators (note that the ad
appeared in an era that preceded "sexism" becoming viewed as a
social taboo). Yet, consider the subconscious, brand enhancing im-
pact this photo and caption had on those male cigarette-consuming
readers not consciously aware of the double entendre. To the ex-
tent that some were encouraged to purchase Winston's as a conse-
quence of this subconscious allusion to sexual fantasy, would we
say that these consumers were acting rationally? The assumption
that most human behavior, including consumer choice behavior, is
a function of conscious or deliberate decision-making is untenable.
4. Consumer behavior is predicated solely upon rational
considerations
At least since Socratic times it has been understood that
human behavior can be rational, emotional or, more often, a combi-
nation of the two. For this reason, instead of relying on rational
48. Richard W. Olshavsky & Donald H. Granbois, Consumer Decision-mak-
ing-Fact or Fiction?, 6 J. Consumer Res. 93 (1979).
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arguments, litigators often rely on painting emotional pictures
when attempting to sway juries. Similarly, many purchase deci-
sions are made because of their emotional or symbolic value, not
because of their functional (or rational) value. Is it rational to
purchase pet rocks or torn jeans? Is it rational to color one's hair
pink, purple and green? Given the pain, healing times that can
last weeks or months, risks of serious infection, unsightly scars
and potential for permanent deformity, is it rational for hundreds
of thousands of Generation X-ers to spend millions of dollars hav-
ing their noses, eyelids, tongues, lips and genitalia pierced? Is it
rational that the celebrity spokesperson in the ad, the color on the
outside package, the color of the cleaning fluid inside the package,
among other things, should exert any influence, much less a sub-
stantial influence, over whether we decide to buy or not buy a par-
ticular product? Is it rational to eat fat-filled desserts?49
As honest introspection should reveal, at one time or another,
we all have made irrational purchase and consumption decisions
and done so simply for the sake of enjoyment or giving in to the
spirit of the moment.50 By ignoring pervasive emotional factors,5
1
or by pretending that these represent but occasional tendencies or
anomalies, Rational Choice Theory cannot claim to provide a com-
prehensive basis for understanding human behavior, including
consumer behavior.
5. Consumers make their choices from "a stable set of
preferences"
To the extent that Rational Choice Theory (as described by
Becker; see above) depends upon "a stable set of preferences," fac-
tors both external and internal to the consumer suggests this as-
sumption to be problematic. Consider the consumer's external
world. If it reflects nothing else, the contemporary marketplace re-
flects a state of exponentially increasing dynamic flux. There used
49. Not according to the author's wife; though, on occasion, he does so anyway.
See generally Morris B. Holbrook & Elizabeth C. Hirschman, The Experiential As-
pects of Consumption: Consumer Fantasies, Feelings, and Fun, 9 J. Consumer Res.
132 (1982) (introducing thought in this area).
50. In the absence of any workable definition of rationality, Rational Choice
Theorists may find some way to interpret this as being rational. This only serves
to re-emphasize the indispensable need for a clear definition of what does and
what does not qualify as "rational."
51. See Slovic, supra note 18.
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to be but a few commercially available fruit juice options; now we
have scores of them. We used to have relatively few brands of pre-
packaged breakfast cereals; now we have hundreds of them. We
used to have few options for taking photographs; now we have doz-
ens of formats. Sixty years ago, if we wanted to listen to pre-re-
corded music, we had player piano spools and phonograph records.
Today we have these, but also audiotapes, videotapes, compact
discs, DVDs, MP3s, etc. More to the point, within each format
there are countless numbers of offerings (e.g., composers, individ-
ual artists, orchestras, arrangements, etc.) in various permuta-
tions and combinations, with this set changing daily.
In other words, the markets for most contemporary consumer
goods (not to mention the tens of thousands of new products intro-
duced each year) are exceptionally dynamic, undergoing frequent
changes in the brands, models, product features, prices, etc. Never
in all recorded history has there been a time when consumers have
had such variety of choice. As a consequence, the external world
can no longer be counted on to provide "a stable set of purchase
options" (which, though not equivalent to "a stable set of prefer-
ences," nonetheless may be assumed to affect one's set of prefer-
ences in meaningful ways).
Especially in the face of such a dynamic outside world, the in-
ternal world can no longer be counted on to provide "a stable set of
preferences." Indeed, the consumer behavior literature provides
numerous bases from which to argue that the consumer does not
necessarily make her choice from "a stable set of preferences." For
example, if preference sets remained stable, one might predict high
levels of brand loyalty, approaching 100%. Yet, in a very large
number of product categories, the rates of brand loyalty are below
(sometimes appreciably below) 50%,52 thereby suggesting that
preference sets are not stable. Further, a considerable amount of
consumer behavior has been shown to reflect a strong exploratory
or variety-seeking component (the strength of which varies across
individual consumers). Though they may have a pre-existing set of
option preferences, consumers also derive enjoyment in departing
from this preference set. Indeed, theoretical reasons have been of-
52. See generally Jacob Jacoby & Robert W. Chestnut, Brand Loyalty: Mea-
surement and Management (1975) (revealing more than fifty different ways to
measure the concept of brand loyalty). Regardless of which approach is used, vir-
tually all find loyalty rates of less than 50% for a majority of consumer products.
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fered to explain how negative affective experiences can be a source
of enjoyment.53
We are not contending that consumers do not have preference
sets. We are contending that there are good (empirically based)
reasons to believe that they are not as stable as is assumed by Ra-
tional Choice Theorists.
6. Consumers always seek to maximize their utility
A fundamental assumption of Rational Choice Theory is that
consumers seek to "maximize," that is, to purchase the best (qua
most satisfying) alternative. But in order to maximize, one need be
aware of, then acquire full and complete information regarding, all
the available options.54 While perhaps possible at some earlier
point in history, this no longer appears feasible in today's complex
and rapidly changing marketplace-a marketplace that offers su-
perabundant choice. Most full service supermarkets around the
country carry an incredible assortment of snacks. Rather than die
of hunger, most would rather not try to identify and exhaustively
evaluate all the available options, but buy one that has usually sat-
isfied in the past-knowing full well that there might be some-
thing else immediately available that could be more satisfying.
Rather than "maximizing," most consumer behavior reflects such
"satisficing," that is, settling for an acceptable ("good enough")55
option out of the universe of possible purchase alternatives.
Economists have come to recognize that, as introduced, the
maximization assumption was problematic. It would be rare for
anyone to be able to obtain an awareness of, much less information
regarding, all the possible options. Given that the option selected
53. See generally Michael J. Apter, The Dangerous Edge: The Psychology of
Excitement 63 (1992) (discussing the concept of "detachment frame").
54. "The [Rational Choice/Chicagol credo does... assert that economic agents
learn all the presently knowable things it pays them to know-always on aver-
age-and act with due regard for this knowledge." Duxbury, supra note 7, at 371
n.356, (quoting George J. Stigler, Economists and Public Policy, 13 Regulation 13,
16 (1982)). We have a serious problem with the phrase "it pays them to know."
Since they cannot know in advance whether it does or does not pay them to acquire
a particular piece of information, does this not imply that the consumer needs to
know everything before they can dismiss anything?
55. James G. March & Herbert A. Simon, Organizations 140-41 (John Wiley
ed., 1958); Herbert A. Simon, Satisficing, in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of
Economics 243-45 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987); Herbert A. Simon, Models of
Bounded Rationality and Other Topics in Economic Theory (1982).
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came from a limited set of options, it could very well be that the
option that would maximize utility did not appear in that set.
Hence, one could never be certain that the decision-maker had se-
lected the option that would maximize his utility. One could only
predict that he would select the best option from among those
known to him. His rationality was thus "bounded" by this choice
set.
Via introduction of the notion of "information costs," Rational
Choice Theorists adjusted the basic assumption to accommodate
the fact that consumers need not seek to identify and evaluate all
the available options prior to making their choice. As Duxbury56
writes:
Chicago economic theorists certainly acknowledge the
bounded nature of economic rationality. Indeed, it was
George Stigler who first suggested that information can be
conceived as an economic commodity. According to Stigler,
the standard economic theorem that, in a competitive mar-
ket, buyers and sellers will seek out and eliminate all differ-
ences in prices fails to take account of information costs.
Conventional economic wisdom teaches that, so long as there
exists a single seller who is willing to accept a price lower
than that which the buyer was about to pay, the buyer will
seek him out. Yet such a claim, Stigler argues, ignores the
fact that buyers must bear the costs of time and travel in
gathering information about comparative prices and services.
For all this, however, Stigler does not regard information
costs as a necessary obstacle to rational economic action. "Ig-
norance," he asserts, "is like sub-zero weather: by a sufficient
expenditure its effects upon people can be kept within tolera-
ble or even comfortable bounds," even though "it would be
wholly uneconomic entirely to eliminate all its effects."[ 57 ] In
other words, despite the fact that individuals contemplating a
transaction can never possess perfect information, they will
nevertheless acquire and act with due regard for all the avail-
able information which they ought, in their own economic in-
terests, to acquire. 58
56. See Duxbury, supra note 7, at 370-71.
57. Id. (quoting George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Politi-
cal Econ. 213, 224 (1961)).
58. Id. (citing George J. Stigler, Economists and Public Policy, 13 Regulation
13, 16-17 (1982)).
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Thus, it seems that economic agents approximate rationality.
However, even this modified assumption presents problems. First,
by assuming that consumers will "acquire and act with due regard
for all the available information which they ought, in their own
economic interests, to acquire," the theory makes no allowances for
basic human tendencies and momentary shifts. 59 Examples in-
clude the possibility that the consumer might be too tired at that
particular moment in time to want to maximize, too lazy in general
to do so, or motivated by something other than economic interests.
A more fundamental problem concerns the notion of "ought."
Ought presumes the existence of some agreed upon identification
of "information which they ought ... to acquire" (versus which in-
formation they ought not acquire). Yet there is no such standard.
Accordingly, who is it that should determine what information
"ought" to be acquired? As is the case with the notion "all the pres-
ently knowable things it pays them to know," is it possible we are
confronting the one-armed fisherman? Absent an accepted stan-
dard for differentiating between information that "ought" to be ac-
quired versus information that "ought not" to be acquired, does not
Rational Choice Theory become a theory that, virtually by defini-
tion, cannot be falsified? For no matter what information is ac-
quired, it can always be argued that the consumer ought to have
acquired something else. As previously noted: "A theory that is not
effectively falsifiable, but only confirmable, is tenuously
grounded."60
True, many economists hold that rationality only assumes
that people do the best they can under the prevailing circum-
stances, not the best under all circumstances. However, when one
cannot specify "all the presently knowable things it pays them to
know," it enables one to claim that any failure of the theory is not
due to flaws in the theory, but to the fact that the decision-makers
simply failed to acquire "all the presently knowable things it pays
them to know," i.e., all the information they "ought to." The net
result is that we are left with a theory that cannot be falsified.
59. Id.
60. Posner, supra note 3, at 365.
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7. In maximizing utility, consumers weigh the risks involved
Many hold that Rational Choice Theory represents an advance
over the early economic models because, in addition to having the
consumer influenced by cost (including information cost) consider-
ations, the consumer is now presumed to consider information per-
taining to risk. Yet Rational Choice Theory appears to ignore the
substantial theoretical and empirical literature in the consumer
behavior realm that provides insights regarding how consumers
perceive and handle risk. Some of these findings are as follows.
As most no doubt appreciate, there is a difference between "ob-
jective risk" and subjectively "perceived risk." Consumers may see
things as being riskier than they are, or may fail to see things as
risky when, objectively, they should. In many instances and for
many consumers, there may be little or no relationship between
"objective risk" and subjectively "perceived risk." To the extent
that Rational Choice Theory focuses upon objective risk, not psy-
chologically perceived risk, it fails to accommodate the realities of
consumer decision-making and behavior.
If they perceive risk-a very big "if-6 1 -consumers have sev-
eral options. First, they can forego any effort at evaluating the
risks and decide to not make the purchase. While this may avoid
some types of risk, it certainly does nothing to avoid the potential
risk of "value foregone."6 2 It is debatable whether decision-making
of this sort is rational and, if so, under what circumstances. Sec-
ond, the consumer may expend effort to evaluate some or all of the
various risks and, at the end of this process, decide to buy (or not
buy) the item. This appears to represent a rational approach. As a
third approach, recognizing the risks, consumers might go ahead
and make the purchase without evaluating these, but by relying on
some strategy (e.g., buy the cheapest, buy the most expensive, buy
the one with the guarantee, buy the well known brand, etc.). It is
uncertain whether reliance upon such heuristics reflects rational
61. See Jacob Jacoby, Some Perspectives on Risk Acceptance, 8 Advances in
Consumer Res. 511 (1981). For example, how many consumers will recognize the
incredible amount of health and safety risk lurking behind a label reading "UN-
CURED FRANKFURTER,... keep refrigerated below 40'F at all times." Id. at
511-12.
62. In the consumer realm, value foregone refers to the risk incurred when an
offering we did not purchase would have been more satisfying than our decision
either not to buy it, or to buy some other option. In a very real sense, the risk lies
in not taking risk,
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decision-making (and, if so, under what circumstances) or just sim-
plified (and potentially irrational) decision-making. Last, with
knowledge that there are (many, perhaps some very severe) risks,
the consumer essentially may say "Damn the torpedoes" and make
the purchase anyway. It is uncertain whether this could be consid-
ered rational decision-making.
The literature also reveals that many consumers not only tol-
erate, but actually enjoy a certain amount of risk. Product offer-
ings and activities possessing little risk often are seen as boring
and may be avoided. Consumer behavior does not necessarily re-
flect an effort to reduce risk, but to keep risk at a comfortable level,
even if that sometimes means deliberately seeking risk enhance-
ment. Consumers buy products and engage in activities (e.g., ski-
ing, bungee jumping) that, though known to be objectively risky to
life and limb, provide a thrill and sense of accomplishment that
results from mastering the risk.63
Third, subjective risk is not a present-absent, zero-one sort of
phenomenon, but exists at various levels. Even when their objec-
tive is to reduce risk, consumers generally reach a decision after
reducing risk to acceptable, but non-zero, levels.64 Moreover, con-
sumers vary in the extent to which they are comfortable accepting
different levels of risk and uncertainty. At what level can it be said
that the amount of tolerated risk is "rational"?
In addition to financial, performance and safety risks, con-
sumer decision-making often includes a consideration of other
forms of risk, including psychological risk (e.g., "As a 22 year-old,
how will it make me feel about myself if the doctor tells me I need
to take Geritol?"), social risk (e.g., "If I buy the Chevy instead of
the Cadillac, what will the neighbors in my upscale community
think of me?") and time risk6s (e.g., if the fancy $18 electric can
opener I use has an annoying sound [versus the $18 bottle of wine
consumed at a single sitting], though it performs its function quite
well, for how long should I feel committed to using it?).
63. See Apter, supra note 53, at 3.
64. See Jacob Jacoby et al., Tracing the Impact of Item-by-Item Information
Accessing on Uncertainty Reduction, 21 J. Consumer Res. 291 (1994).
65. See generally Leon B. Kaplan et al., Components of Perceived Risk in Prod-
uct Purchase: A Cross-Validation, 59 J. Applied Psychol. 287 (1974) (discussing
empirical research on different types of perceived risk in relation to products).
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Consumers will engage in risk trade-offs, for example, incur-
ring greater financial risk to avoid incurring greater performance
risk. While they may be acting rationally when they do so, they
also may be acting irrationally. This is because many consumers
haven't the foggiest idea of how to work with independent and es-
pecially joint probabilities. (Consider the airline passenger who, in
an effort to reduce his risk of dying as a result of a terrorist bomb
placed on his plane, carries his own bomb onto the plane, reason-
ing that the likelihood of there being two bombs on the same plane
was infinitesimal.)
Despite the importance of performance, financial and safety
risks, there are situations where social, personal and "value-fore-
gone"6 6 risks outweigh the former. Suppose a caring mother in the
midst of deciding to buy her child a bicycle, comes across the Na-
tional Emergency Room statistics showing that bicycles are one of
the most dangerous toys. She is startled to learn that emergency
rooms treat more children as a result of bicycle accidents than acci-
dents involving any other toy. By buying the bicycle, the mother
accepts higher levels of safety risk for the child in order to reduce
the possibility of the child experiencing ego risk (e.g., thinking less
of himself), social risk (e.g., having his friends think less of him)
and value foregone risk (e.g., not experiencing the enjoyment that
comes from riding a bike). Often, it is not possible to simultane-
ously maximize (which, in this case, actually means minimize) all
forms of risk. What implications does this have for Rational
Choice Theory?
Last, because consumers often have little ability (and/or de-
sire) to evaluate various risks inherent in many product purchase
and usage situations, 67 they rely on simplifying heuristics to han-
dle risk. Such heuristics include: buy the least expensive option (in
an effort to reduce financial risk); buy the most expensive option
66. Value foregone refers to the risk that an unselected purchase option may
be more satisfying than the option we do buy.
67. See generally Matthew L. Wald, Crash Statistics vs. Safety Systems, N.Y.
Times, June 23, 2000, at F1 (illustrating that sometimes the effort to reduce a
particular form of risk may actually lead to increasing that very same form of risk
in unanticipated ways). For example, data reveals that consumers who purchase
anti-lock brakes to increase driving safety are involved in a greater rate of fatal
crashes than those without anti-lock brakes. Why is the ability to stop faster asso-
ciated with higher risks? Some speculate it is because drivers having anti-lock
brake systems become overconfident, driving faster as a result.
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(in an effort to reduce performance risk); buy the option with the
best guarantee; rely on the firm with the biggest ad in the Yellow
Pages; rely on familiar or major manufacturer brands; rely on
what the salesperson recommends; be brand loyal (since, as a con-
sequence of past experience, we already know and accept the risks
with that offering); etc. While sometimes rational, these same
strategies may also be irrational-as when the consumer follows a
salesperson recommendation without factoring in whether the
salesperson receives a higher commission on that item, or when
being brand loyal means one may be foregoing greater satisfaction
and value from a brand not purchased, etc. As a possible example
of value foregone (and satisficing rather than maximizing), con-
sider what one author wrote in 1990:
I have owned Volvo automobiles (a total of four) since 1963,
and have been generally satisfied with them. I infer from this
experience that if I replace my present Volvo with a new one I
probably will be satisfied with the new one too. The prior
purchases are "precedents" or "analogies" that create a cer-
tain likelihood that I will be satisfied if I buy another Volvo
the next time I am in the market for a car.68
On the very next page, that same writer acknowledges that
"Generalizing from observations is perilous.... Some Volvos are
lemons." Given this and the many changes in the auto market dur-
ing the three decades spanning 1963-1990 (including the introduc-
tion of directly competing new makes and models, e.g. Acura,
Infiniti), assuming this individual is in the market for a new car,
would it be rational for him to forgo considering information re-
garding these other brands and simply buy another Volvo? It
might. Then again, it might not-especially if one of the alterna-
tives is likely to be considerably more satisfying, but yet was never
considered and evaluated. Under these circumstances-where the
person failed to consider all the information it paid him to know
and, as a consequence, failed to maximize satisfaction-Rational
Choice Theory suggests that remaining brand loyal is not rational.
To the extent that Rational Choice Theory fails to accommo-
date factors such as (a) when making a purchase decision, consum-
ers either do not perceive or, if perceived, may deliberately ignore
risks, (b) others, though interested in reducing risk, have difficulty
68. Posner, supra note 3, at 87-88.
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appraising or calculating risks, (c) many often engage in deliberate
risk enhancement, etc., it represents theory divorced from con-
sumer reality.
8. When not presumed, satisfaction can easily be measured
As compared to measuring such things as "love," "intelli-
gence," "fairness" and the like, measuring gender is relatively easy.
One's gender is externally detectable and (except for exceptionally
rare cases) exists in only two forms: male or female. Different re-
searchers are likely to have no disagreement when measuring
whether a particular homo sapien was "male" or "female."
In contrast, consider the concept of "hunger" as used in the
hypothesis: "The hungrier the person, the more aggressive the per-
son." To test this hypothesis, one would need to measure the de-
gree to which different respondents were or felt "hungry." How
could one do this? Of course, one could ask the participants to
place a checkmark along some "Extremely hungry" to "Not at all
hungry" scale. One could also measure their blood sugar level. Or
one could place a standard amount of food in front of each (e.g., two
pounds of pasta or five pounds of filet mignon) and weigh how
much is left after each has eaten. Since they may not like pasta or
steak to the same degree, one might select each person's most fa-
vorite food, attach some financial or physical cost to obtaining it,
and measure how much the person is willing to spend to secure
this food. Yet another approach to testing the above hypothesis
would be to deprive people of food for different lengths of time (2
hours, 4 hours, 8 hours, 12 hours, etc.), then measure if those de-
prived for greater length of time became more aggressive. Suppose
one employed all these ways of measuring hunger at the same time
and found that they yielded findings that did not agree?
The point of this illustration is as follows. If hunger, a funda-
mental sensation connected to an objectively measurable physio-
logical state, is so difficult to measure, imagine how difficult it is to
measure such abstract concepts as "love," "intelligence" and "satis-
faction." Moreover, what if, like intelligence, satisfaction is a
multi-faceted concept requiring different approaches to measuring
each of its facets? Further, what if a person had different satisfac-
tion levels associated with different features of an offering? For
example, suppose he was very satisfied with the zoom lens on his
camera, not at all satisfied with the shutter speeds, moderately
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satisfied with the quality of the lens, moderately satisfied with the
photos under normal lighting, dissatisfied with the photos taken
under flash conditions, etc.? What may be easily theorized or as-
sumed may not as easily be defined and measured. Without scien-
tifically reliable, valid measures of "satisfaction," the central
dependent variable of Rational Choice Theory is incapable of
proper empirical assessment.
9. Information provision will translate into information impact
Rational Choice Theory is considered to represent an advance
over early economic theory in part due to its emphasis on supply-
ing consumers with information. A key assumption is that the
market place works well in supplying consumers with product in-
formation. Further, when they possess an optimal or adequate69
amount of information, people act rationally to maximize their own
self-interest. Unfortunately for Rational Choice Theory, numerous
empirical studies reveal these assumptions to be untenable.
As a framework for describing the relevant evidence, consider
the following. Considerable research exists to show that the ma-
jority of consumer purchase behavior is predicated upon "low ef-
fort" or "low involvement" decision-making. 70 Such decision-
making is characterized by little or no information seeking or eval-
uation. Instead, decisions are based on such factors as mood, feel-
ings, and easily applied (though not necessarily rational)
heuristics. Clearly, when consumers fail to attend to information
(as is generally the case in low effort decision-making), there is lit-
tle opportunity that supplying information (e.g., regarding safety
or other forms of risk) will have any effect.
What about "high effort" decision-making, decision-making
where the consumer may be expected to process information?
When studying deliberate, conscious, "high effort" decision-making
and choice behavior, most consumer, marketing, advertising and
communication research relies upon an elaboration of the basic S-
O-R model known as the General Communication Model, the latter
69. Just what constitutes "adequate" or "optimal" information? Without such
a definition, it can always be held that any failure to confirm the theory was not
due to the theory, but to the fact that the consumer was not provided with "ade-
quate" or "optimal" information.
70. See generally Hoyer & Maclnnis, supra note 1, at chs. 6 & 10 (discussing
low effort decision-making).
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subsuming one variant or another of a Hierarchy of Effects (HOE)
Model.
As depicted in Figure 3, the General Communication Model
holds that communication is a process whereby a source (e.g., a
manufacturer, retailer, advertiser, salesperson, friend, Consumer
Reports magazine, etc.) transmits a message (informational con-
tent, including cost and risk information) via one or more media
(e.g., a product's package, a TV commercial, a newspaper adver-
tisement or article, etc.) in order to reach a receiver (i.e., the con-
sumer) for the purpose of achieving certain effects (such as
generating favorable opinions or purchase behavior). The General
Communication Model thus divides the Stimulus into Source and
Message, while the Organism is the Receiver/Consumer and the
Response is viewed as a series of responses termed Effects. If the
Receiver reaches that stage, the very last Effect often takes the
form of overt behavior, such as purchase, communicating one's
thoughts and feelings to others (via word-of-mouth communica-
tions), or reversing roles by becoming the Source and converting
the original Source into the Receiver (such as when the consumer
then turns to the salesperson and asks "But why is the digital cam-
era better for me?"). In contrast to where the Receiver cannot or
does not reverse roles (a situation referred to as "one-way commu-
nication" that typifies mass media communications), this latter
condition reflects "two-way communication."71
The effects produced by a communication are generally con-
ceptualized to occur in sequential or hierarchical form, hence, the
name Hierarchy of Effects. According to this widely held perspec-
tive,72 failure at an earlier stage either eliminates or severely lim-
its what happens at subsequent stages. 73 Specifically, exposure to
incoming information is assumed to precede attention and percep-
tion, attention and perception to information are believed to pre-
71. Though it may seem complex, this is a bare-bones description of the pro-
cess. For the sake of simplification, important sub-processes (e.g., encoding and
decoding) and components have been omitted.
72. The Hierarchy of Effects Model depicted here is a simplification. Many
variations of this perspective exist, with some depicting at least 15 separate stages
in the receiver's reaction to the incoming communication. See generally William J.
McGuire, Some Internal Psychological Factors Influencing Consumer Choice, 2 J.
Consumer Res. 302 (1976) (providing a cogent overview).
73. See, e.g., William J. McGuire, Attitude Change: The Information Process-
ing Paradigm, in Experimental Social Psychology 119-20 (C. G. McClintlock ed.,
1972).
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cede comprehension, comprehension is considered a pre-requisite
for evaluation, evaluation precedes reaching a decision, making a
choice and forming a purchase intention which, in turn, is consid-
ered to be a prerequisite for the actual behavior. Moreover, moti-
vation is presumed to exert a pervasive influence upon all the
stages. As discussed below, the HOE stages have very important
implications for Rational Choice Theory.
Predicated upon our current familiarity with the pertinent
literature in this arena, it seems as if, with few notable excep-
tions,74 criticism of75 and commentaries regarding76 Rational
Choice Theory have tended to focus attention primarily on the
evaluation and decision stages. Much of this attention has been
devoted to research demonstrating "irrational" biases in evaluation
and decision-making, especially as influenced by Herbert A. Simon
and exemplified in the work of others, particularly Khanemann
and Tversky. 77 What appears to be missing is consideration of the
earlier information acquisition and processing stages that are pre-
requisite for evaluation and decision-making, and other research
streams that study how various communication factors (e.g.,
source credibility; message sidedness) affect evaluation and deci-
sion-making.
Both the General Communication and HOE Models have
many uses, including the ability to explain why information provi-
sion often does not translate into achieving information impact,
much less the desired impact. A number of steps intervene be-
tween the input (the information provided by the source) and the
output (impact on the consumer), any one of which can be responsi-
ble for distortion or non-reception of the communication. Consider
the following: It should be obvious that it matters not how much or
just what information is communicated by the source. Exposure is
the first of several critical prerequisites. If the consumer is not
74. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Se-
riously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630 (1999).
75. See Jolls et al., supra note 28. See also Christine Jolls et al., Theories and
Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelman, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1593 (1998).
76. See Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A
Response to Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1577 (1998); Richard A.
Posner, supra note 2, at 1551.
77. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Khaneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in Judgment Under Uncertainty 1 (Daniel Khaneman et al.
eds., 1982); Daniel Khaneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decisions Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979).
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exposed to this information, that information cannot exert an in-
fluence over that person's decision-making.
Further, just because a person is exposed to information does
not necessarily mean that he attends to that information. A con-
sumer may read an article on page four of today's New York Times
and, by so doing, become exposed to an ad appearing on that page.
Yet exposure to the ad does not guarantee attention to that ad. As
Lloyd78 indicates, as part of their daily lives, virtually all consum-
ers in contemporary American society are bombarded with
thousands of promotional communications. To avoid having their
cognitive (including perceptual and intellectual) systems "over-
loaded" by letting in and processing too much information,7 9 con-
sumers engage in selective exposure. Considerable research exists
to confirm that most people pay attention to only a fraction of the
information available and to which they are exposed.80
Because a person attends to a message does not necessarily
mean that he attends to the entire message. Indeed, research
shows that consumers engage in considerable selective attention.
For example, today's full-service American supermarket contains
approximately 20,000 different products. Limiting attention to one
78. See Carla V. Lloyd, Advertising Media: A Changing Marketplace, in The
Advertising Business: Operations, Creativity, Media Planning, Integrated Com-
munications 89, 89-93 (John Philips Jones ed., 1999).
79. See, e.g., Jacob Jacoby, Perspectives on Information Overload, 10 J. Con-
sumer Res. 432 (1984); Jacob Jacoby, Information Load and Decision Quality:
Some Contested Issues, 14 J. Marketing Res. 569 (1977); Jacob Jacoby et al., Brand
Choice Behavior as a Function of Information Load: Replication and Extension, 1
J. Consumer Res. 33 (1974); Jacob Jacoby et al., Brand Choice Behavior as a Func-
tion of Information Load, 11 J. Marketing Res. 63 (1974). Interestingly, Greg Duf-
fee, a former researcher for the Federal Reserve and now a professor at Berkeley,
attributes stock market volatility to the effect of information overload on efficient
markets. See Alex Berenson, On Information Overload and the 'Efficient' Market,
N.Y. Times, May 21, 2000, § 3, at 1.
80. See Jacob Jacoby et al., A Behavioral Process Approach to Information Ac-
quisition in Non-Durable Purchasing, 15 J. Marketing Res. 532 (1978); Jacob
Jacoby et al., Information Acquisition Behavior in Brand Choice Situations, 3 J.
Consumer Res. 209 (1977). A considerable body of empirical findings reveals that
consumers typically attend to only a few of the many features associated with a
product. See, e.g., Robert W. Chestnut & Jacob Jacoby, Behavioral Process Re-
search: Concept and Application in Consumer Decision-making, in Decision-Mak-
ing: An Interdisciplinary Inquiry 232 (Gerardo R. Ungson & Daniel N. Braunstein
eds., 1982); Jacob Jacoby et al., Pre-Purchase Information Acquisition, in 3 Ad-
vances in Consumer Res. 306 (Bevelee B. Anderson ed., 1976); Jacob Jacoby et al.,
Consumer Use and Comprehension of Nutrition Information, 4 J. Consumer Res.
119 (1976).
CONSUMER RATIONALITY?
category of commonly purchased goods, consider trying to be a ra-
tional maximizer when purchasing breakfast cereal. Most full ser-
vice suburban supermarkets typically carry more than one
hundred different brands of cereal. As examination readily
reveals, the package for each of these brands typically contains
more than one hundred separate, objectively identifiable items of
information. Even the first time purchaser hardly pays attention
to all this information as, at five seconds per item, reading and
attempting to comprehend this information would require (100 x 5
=) 500 seconds, or nearly 10 minutes for each carton examined.
(Doing this for 100 boxes, without a break, would require in excess
of 16 hours.) Instead, consumers typically pay attention only to
information that, a priori, they think would be relevant, important
or interesting, and ignore the remainder.
Rational Choice Theorists might point to selective attention
and selective perception as reflecting rational decision-making.
However, if these simplifying (not necessarily rational) tendencies
lead consumers to ignore information that it pays them to know
and which they ought to acquire, then it seems a difficult stretch to
interpret these universal human tendencies as reflecting rational-
ity. Relatedly, Rational Choice Theorists accept that, as a basis for
reaching rational decisions, an impossible ideal would be to expect
the consumer to consider all the pertinent information available in
the marketplace. Instead, its theorists hold that, "despite the fact
that individuals contemplating a transaction can never possess
perfect information, they will nevertheless acquire and act with
due regard for all the available information which they ought, in
their own economic interests, to acquire.""' To this writer, it
seems that agreement is not likely on what information "ought" to
be acquired. (Indeed, what information "ought" Judge Posner con-
sider regarding Volvo and its competitors before making his next
automobile purchase decision?) Thus, the construct "ought" seems
to defy acceptable operationalization. Yet absent such an opera-
tionalization, Rational Choice Theory becomes a theory that can-
not be falsified.
For discussion purposes, let us assume that this problem
presents no insurmountable obstacle, i.e., it can be shown that de-
81. Duxbury, supra note 7, at 371 (quoting George J. Stigler, Economists and
Public Policy, 13 Regulation 13, 16 (1982)).
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cision-makers acting "with due regard for all the available infor-
mation," actually acquire all the information "which they ought, in
their own economic interests, to acquire."8 2 Yet information acqui-
sition does not guarantee either accurate perception or accurate
comprehension of that information.
Consider perception. Often we see what we expect to see, or
see what the context suggests we should see. Expectations or con-
text effects can cause us to ignore disconfirming information and
"overwrite" what we objectively do see. In one classic demonstra-
tion, researchers exposed test subjects to a handful of playing
cards. Among the cards was one very unusual card-either a black
four of hearts or a red four of spades. When then asked to identify
the cards they saw, what did the respondents report seeing?. Upon
coming across an incongruent card (such as a red four of spades),
more than 96% "called the red four of spades either a red four of
hearts, or black four of spades (ignoring either the incongruous
color or incongruous form)."83 In other words, in the context of the
other "normal" cards, the respondents overwrote what, objectively,
they did see and instead saw what they expected to see.
Now consider comprehension. If attention and perception
were all that were required for full and accurate comprehension,
readers of this paper most likely would have received grades of 100
and A on all their exams, at least through high school. Using
large, projectable nationwide samples, ample evidence exists to
show that, on average, television viewers and magazine readers
miscomprehend approximately 20% to 25% of the material mean-
ings they read in magazines" or see and hear on television.8 5
82. As one who has devoted a portion of his academic career to developing and
applying methods for studying the product information consumers actually do ac-
quire (as opposed to what they say they have acquired or would acquire) and has
published a score or more scholarly articles on this very subject, this writer does
not recall more than a percent or two of consumers ever having acquired all the
relevant information from among the information made immediately available to
them. This includes several studies where real world consequences were attached
to these decisions.
83. Ernest R. Hilgard, Introduction to Psychology 386 (2d ed. 1957).
84. Jacob Jacoby & Wayne D. Hoyer, The Comprehension and Miscomprehen-
sion of Print Communications (1987).
85. Jacob Jacoby et al., The Miscomprehension of Television Advertising,
American Association of Advertising Agencies (1980) [hereinafter Jacoby et al. I].
Parenthetically, Judge Posner speculates that the potential to misunderstand a
written communication is greater than is the potential to misunderstand a spoken
communication. "IThe danger of misunderstanding a spoken communication is
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Strikingly, this research shows that virtually 100% of the popula-
tion miscomprehends at least some portion of these "common de-
nominator mass media" communications, and that this occurs
regardless of the level of formal education. J.D.s, L.L.Ds and
Ph.Ds miscomprehend material elements of these simple commu-
nications at nearly the same rates as do those whose formal educa-
tion ended with high school diplomas or less.8 6 In similar fashion,
research on product warning labels8 7 and disclaimers8 8 reveals
that consumer attention to and comprehension of such information
is far from optimal, often hovering in the range of 10% to 20%. Re-
search showing that trademark disclaimers tend to be minimally
effective 89 formed the basis for several Second Circuit decisions
shifting the burden of proof in disclaimer cases from plaintiffs to
defendants.90 Indeed, Section 43a of the Lanham Act, a corner-
stone of trademark and advertising law, represents explicit ac-
knowledgement that some factors and actions are likely to cause
consumer misperception, miscomprehension and confusion.
reduced by the fact that the speaker's inflection and facial expressions help dispel
ambiguities in his words; it is almost as if inflection and facial expression were
additional words. [Further,] a listener can seek clarification from the speaker."
Posner, supra note 3, at 102. Actually, it is the latter (two-way) aspect of commu-
nication that accounts for spoken communications being better comprehended.
When the ability to "seek clarification" is removed (i.e., when audio, video and
written communications are reduced to one-way communications, as is the case
with TV, radio and magazine communications), written communications are signif-
icantly better comprehended than are audio-video or audio-only communications.
See Jacob Jacoby et al., To Read, View or Listen? A Cross-Media Comparison of
Comprehension, in 201 Current Issues and Research in Advertising (James H.
Leigh & Claude R. Martin, Jr. eds., 1983) [hereinafter Jacoby et al. III.
86. See Jacoby & Hoyer, supra note 84, at 115-19; Jacob Jacoby et al. I, supra
note 85, at 80-81.
87. See Eli P. Cox, III et al., Do Product Warnings Increase Safe Behavior?, 16
J. Pub. Pol'y & Marketing 195 (1997); Pam S. Ellen et al., How Well Do Young
People Follow the Label? An Investigation of Four Classes of Over-the-Counter
Drugs, 17 J. Pub. Pol'y & Marketing 70 (1998); Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings,
Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1193 (1994).
88. See Jacob Jacoby & Maureen Morrin, "Not Manufactured or Authorized By
.": Recent Federal Cases Involving Trademark Disclaimers, 17 J. Pub. Pol'y &
Marketing 97 (1998).
89. See Jacob Jacoby & Robert L. Raskopf, Disclaimers in Trademark In-
fringement Litigation: More Trouble Than They Are Worth?, The Trademark Re-
porter 76 (1986).
90. See Charles of the Ritz Group, Ltd. v. Quality King Distrib., Inc., 832 F.2d
1317 (2d Cir. 1987); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc.,
832 F.2d 1311 (2d Cir. 1987).
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With respect to the information integration and decision-mak-
ing stages, we simply note that various kinds of "rational" choice
models do not rely on linear regression. Discussion of these com-
pensatory, non-compensatory and combinatorial models may be
found in most introductory consumer behavior texts.9 1
One objective in describing the HOE and a few of its well con-
firmed findings is to suggest that, by focussing on one stream of
research impacting the evaluation and decision stage, one may ig-
nore much of the real meat underlying consumer decision-making
and choice behavior-content having substantial implications for
Rational Choice Theory and Behavioral-Law-and-Economics. For
example, research on information evaluation and its impact on at-
titudes shows that a receiver's evaluation of message content may
vary considerably, depending upon the order in which the message
components are supplied. Given that, except for the fact that it is
provided in different orders, the information provided is exactly
the same, how does Rational Choice Theory explain such
differences?
If one assumes that, for consumers to engage in rational deci-
sion-making and choice behavior, one only need provide them with
the requisite information, one will be operating with an untenable
assumption. It is unclear how Rational Choice Theory handles
such issues as consumers attending to only portions of the relevant
information or, worse yet, miscomprehending material aspects of
said information.
F. Consumer Behavior Defined: Some Implications for Rational
Choice Theory
Consumer behavior has been defined as the acquisition, con-
sumption and disposition of goods, services, time and ideas by deci-
sion-making units.92 As this definition implies, purchase is but
one way consumers can acquire products or services. Other ways
include finding, trading for, renting, borrowing, receiving as a gift
91. See, e.g., Hoyer & MacInnis, supra note 1, at 220-28; Peter & Olson, supra
note 1, at 160-61.
92. See Jacob Jacoby, Consumer Psychology as a Social Psychological Sphere
of Action, 30 Am. Psychologist 977, 979 (1975); Jacob Jacoby, Consumer and Indus-
trial Psychology: Prospects for Theory Corroboration and Mutual Contribution, in
Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Behavior 1031, 1031-33 (Marvin D.
Dunnette ed., 1976); Arch Woodside et al., Consumer and Industrial Buying Be-
havior (1977); Hoyer and MacInnis, supra note 1, at 3.
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and stealing. Regarding stealing, given the embarrassment, the
possible pain inflicted upon one's family and the implications that
a conviction might have for future employment possibilities, most
would agree that stealing is an irrational form of product acquisi-
tion. Yet nearly two-thirds of the general public admits to having
shoplifted at one time or another.93 Consumer theft of products
and services (e.g., cable TV) is widespread. "Officials at Holiday
Inn estimate that a towel is stolen every 11 seconds. Clocks, hair
dryers, and even artwork are among the items stolen from ho-
tels."94 Do such behaviors represent relying upon irrational means
to achieve short term "rational" ends?
Moreover, there are many aspects to acquisition qua purchase.
One can envision scenarios where one may be satisfied with the
item acquired but not with the payment mode, e.g., the merchant
wont accept credit cards. Another aspect of acquisition is the envi-
ronment and its various components, e.g., in-store (including at-
mosphere,95 clientele, sales force, etc.), phone, Internet, etc. One
can envision scenarios where one may be satisfied with the item
acquired, but not the salesperson helping us. It is unclear how
these various factors are incorporated into the utility maximiza-
tion formula.
Like acquisition, consumption also admits to various forms of
irrational decision-making and behavior. This includes addictive
and compulsive consumption behaviors. "For example, betting
twice one's weekly salary on a horse is not a rational act;.... Eat-
ing two dozen donuts is not rational, but compulsive (binge) eaters
might consume food in such quantities."96 Evidence exists to show
that addictive and compulsive behaviors may have their roots in
genetic factors, dysfunctional families, the consumer's personality
and various other factors.97 To what extent, if any, is Rational
93. See Hoyer and Maclnnis, supra note 1, at 530.
94. Id.
95. See Retail Atmospherics, supra note 9.
96. Hoyer and MacInnis, supra note 1, at 535.
97. See generally George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on
Behavior, 65 Org. Behavior and Human Decision Processes 272 (1996) (theorizing
why people behave in contradiction to what they correctly perceive to be their own
self-interest); George Loewenstein, A Visceral Account of Addiction, in Getting
Hooked 235 (Jon Elster & Jorgen Skog eds., 1999) (applying this theory to addic-
tive behaviors).
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Choice Theory able to accommodate these influences and determi-
nants of consumer behavior?
Consumption is also the stage where the consumer arrives at
impressions of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Consumer research-
ers have devoted considerable attention to studying how consum-
ers arrive at such impressions (and what they do as a
consequence).98 At core, work in this area holds that dissatisfac-
tion is the result of a discrepancy between the consumer's pre-
purchase expectations and the consumer's post-purchase evalua-
tion of product performance. Dissatisfaction results when perform-
ance falls below expectations. When strong, dissatisfaction can
motivate the person to action. As an illustration of how the same
motive may lead to different behaviors (see Figure 2), consider how
a consumer may react in the face of dissatisfaction. He may decide
to complain (either to the retailer or the manufacturer); though not
complaining to those with a commercial interest, he may engage in
negative word-of-mouth conversations with family, friends and
neighbors; he may decide never to purchase the item again; he may
decide to re-purchase the item one more time on a trial basis; he
may revise his expectations and continue to purchase the item on
more than one subsequent occasion; he may decide to do nothing;
etc.
The work on consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction raises sev-
eral questions for Rational Choice Theory. As examples, what hap-
pens when the consumer's expectations are unrealistically
inflated, so that even good performance is viewed as inferior per-
formance? Under these circumstances, is dissatisfaction rational
(according to the common understanding of the term rational)? Or
what about the many instances where the consumer is unable or
incapable of evaluating performance, 99 but does so anyway, often
basing their evaluations on irrelevant, non-diagnostic informa-
98. See generally Hoyer & Maclnnis, supra note 1, at 274-80 (providing a brief
overview of this work); Peter & Olson, supra note 1, at 377-80 (same); Richard L.
Oliver, Satisfaction: A Behavioral Perspective on the Consumer (1997) (providing a
more detailed description of customer satisfaction).
99. See generally Jacob Jacoby & James J. Jaccard, The Sources, Meaning,
and Validity of Consumer Complaint Behavior: A Psychological Analysis, 57 J. Re-
tailing 4 (1981) (examining factors which might have brought about consumer
complaints and actions for redress regarding the Firestone 500 steel belted radial
tires).
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tion'00 or subjective impressions that disregard objective perform-
ance?10 1 Again, under these circumstances, is dissatisfaction
rational (according to the common understanding of the term ra-
tional)? Though we have noted but a few, numerous other implica-
tions flow from the above definition.
II. JUDGE POSNER'S DEFENSE AND ELUCIDATION OF RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY
Some in economics (including at least one of its spiritual foun-
ders 10 2 ) and law have challenged Rational Choice Theory in en-
tirety or in part. A number of these challengers adopt a
perspective that has been termed "behavioral economics" (which is
not the same as "behaviorist economics," something discussed be-
low under the rubric "The Question of Theory"). One perspective
on behavioral economics was provided by Jolls, Sunstein and Tha-
ler. 0 3 As perhaps the most prominent proponent of Rational
Choice Theory, the Honorable Richard A. Posner of the United
States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, was invited to comment
upon the Jolls et al. paper. In that commentary, 104 Judge Posner
sets forth a number of arguments that, while critical of behavioral
economics, also represent a defense and elucidation of Rational
Choice Theory.
Each time we read Judge Posner's writings-whether in the
form of a judicial decision, 10 5 a scholarly treatise, 0 6 or as dis-
cussed by others' 0 7 -we find in them exceptionally rich, thought-
100. See Jacob Jacoby et al., Price, Brand Name, and Product Composition
Characteristics as Determinants of Perceived Quality, 55 J. Appl. Psychol 570
(1971).
101. See David K. Tse & Peter C. Wilson, Models of Consumer Satisfaction For-
mation: An Extension, J. Marketing Res. 204 (1998).
102. See Posner, supra note 2, at 1552 n.4. "It is noteworthy that Professor
Coase, whom [one may] properly regard as a principal founder of'conventional' law
and economics.. ., rejects the traditional economic model of man as a rational max-
imizer of his satisfactions." Id.
103. See Jolls, supra note 28, at 1471.
104. See Posner, supra note 2, at 1551.
105. See Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club Ltd.
P'ship, 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1994).
106. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 3.
107. See, e.g., J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Com-
petition 27-168 (1999).
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provoking ideas.' 08 One cannot help but be awed by the erudition
and breadth of intellect displayed. In the majority of instances, we
agree with (often to the point of being inspired by) Judge Posner's
observations.10 9
When it comes to Rational Choice Theory, however, our famili-
arity with behavioral science research and, more generally, the
logic of scientific research, suggests to us that a number of Judge
Posner's comments in opposition to behavioral economics and in
support of Rational Choice Theory may be misguided and untena-
ble. In our opening paragraph, we opined: "Virtually without ex-
ception, those familiar with the extensive scholarly empirical
literature on consumer behavior would conclude that, as proposed
by contemporary economists and legal theoreticians who espouse
it, Rational Choice Theory is a simplistic theory having little corre-
spondence with the real world of (individual) consumer behav-
ior."110 Elucidating upon why we hold this opinion, this section
discusses a number of the arguments made by Judge Posner in The
Problems of Jurisprudence"' and, more recently, in the aforemen-
tioned Stanford Law Review article.112
A brief digression is in order before turning to this discussion.
This writer has been involved in several hundred federally adjudi-
cated matters, usually proffering testimony on the empirical re-
search he designed and conducted for the matter at hand. From
time to time, some of these matters (including his research) have
come before the Seventh Circuit. In the past, Judge Posner has, in
the main, commented favorably upon this work. 113 However, there
may come a time when the writer's research again comes before
108. See Posner, supra note 2, at 1570. Indeed, Judge Posner observes: "People
who are unusually 'fair' will avoid [or . . . be forced out of) roughhouse activi-
ties-including... the academic rat race." Id. This helps to explain why, in a study
of a medium sized scholarly association, this author found an inverse correlation
between years in the association and support for a code of ethics and related en-
forcement mechanisms.
109. Having virtually nothing to do with Judge Posner's courtroom decisions, a
manuscript we are now preparing (entitled "The role of the judiciary in fostering
and creating junk science"), owes some of its inspiration to and uses many citations
from Judge Posner's The Problems of Jurisprudence.
110. See supra text, at 83-84.
111. See Posner, supra note 3.
112. See Posner, supra note 2.
113. See Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club Ltd.
P'ship, 34 F.3d 410, 415 (7th Cir. 1994).
CONSUMER RATIONALITY?
Judge Posner. In light of the various risks involved, one might ask
whether, by so publicly sharing opinions critical of Judge Posner's
views, is this writer acting rationally and in his own best (maxi-
mizing) self-interest? One answer may be that, in this instance, he
is not behaving as a rational actor, but as an irrational fool.
On the other hand, Judge Posner seems to be open to and, in-
deed, invite criticism of his positions. 114 Accepting Judge Posner's
"preoccupation with objectivity,"1 15 and oft-expressed openness to
inquiry, criticism, the scientific approach'1 6 and feedback, 117 this
writer's commentary may be understood as being rational. Indeed,
it would be difficult for it to be interpreted as anything else, espe-
cially by someone describing his values as follows:
The brand of pragmatism I like emphasizes the scientific vir-
tues (open-minded, no nonsense inquiry), elevates the process
of inquiry over the results of inquiry, prefers ferment to sta-
sis, . . . likes experimentation, likes to kick sacred cows,
and-within the bounds of prudence-prefers shaping the fu-
ture to maintaining continuity with the past.118
I . . law needs more of the scientific spirit than it has-the
spirit of inquiry, challenge, fallibilism, open-mindedness, re-
spect for fact, and acceptance of change. 119
... a fallibilist theory of knowledge emphasizes, as precondi-
tions to the growth of scientific and other forms of knowledge,
the continual testing and retesting of accepted "truths," the
constant kicking over of sacred cows-in short, a commitment
to robust and free-wheeling inquiry with no intellectual quar-
ter asked or given.120
A lawyer who loses a case in the Supreme Court, a judge who
is reversed by the Court, a law professor commenting on the
Court's latest (and let us say unanimous) decision-none of
these is speaking nonsense, or even violating professional eti-
quette, if he says the decision is wrong. Our legal discourse is
114. See Posner, supra note 3, at 362 ("Stated as boldly, as provocatively, as I
have stated it, the economic thesis invites attack from a variety of quarters."). Id.
115. Id. at 454.
116. See id. at 70, 458, 468.
117. See id. at 459-60.
118. Id. at 28.
119. Id. at 465.
120. See Posner, supra note 3, at 466.
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not so positivistic that one is forbidden to appeal to a "higher
law" even after the oracles of law have spoken. 121
To quote William Blake, "without contraries is no
progression."122
... if the shoe happens to fit-it is not responsive to point out
that the criticism comes from outside [economics or] the legal
system .... That is an ostrich's tactic."123
Hence, we anticipate that the commentary and criticisms offered
here will be understood not as a sign of disrespect (as nothing
would be further from the truth), but as coming from one who
shares the same values articulated immediately above.
A. Defining Rational and Rationality
Acknowledging that Jolls et al. "complain with some justice
that economists and economically minded lawyers do not always
make clear what they mean by 'rationality,'" Judge Posner contin-
ues: "let me make clear at the outset what I mean by the word:
choosing the best means to the chooser's ends .... No doubt my
definition lacks precision and rigor .... Rational choice need not
be conscious choice." 124 We have three principal problems with
this definition. These have to do with 1) the means-end distinc-
tion; 2) the objectivity (and operationalizability) of this definition
of rationality; and 3) the notion of unconscious rationality.
The means-end distinction
Four combinations are possible with regard to the rationality
of means and ends. Both can be rational; both can be irrational; or
one can be rational while the other is not (rational means, irra-
tional ends and vice versa). Regarding ends, just which ends are
we talking about-our short term, intermediate term or long term
ends? What if these ends (or the means for achieving them) con-
flict with one another? According to Judge Posner, Rational Choice
Theory is not concerned with whether or not the ends are rational:
The difference between the ex ante and ex post perspectives
is fundamental, and failure to attend to it underlies much
121. Id. at 80.
122. Id. at 461.
123. Id. at 440.
124. Posner, supra note 2, at 1551; see also Posner, supra note 3, at 354 ("ra-
tional denotes suiting means to ends, rather than mulling things over.... ").
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confused thinking .... Because many choices are made, un-
avoidably, under conditions of uncertainty, a fair number
must turn out badly. Ex post, they are regarded as mistaken
and engender regret, yet ex ante they may have been per-
fectly sensible. 125
Yet if the ends are irrational, does it matter that we use rational
means in attaining them?
The Objectivity of Rationality (as Defined)
From whose perspective is rationality defined? Is it from the
individual decision-maker's perspective or from the vantage point
of some external, objective criterion? If one employs the decision-
maker's perspective, then (aside from wondering what the heck
economists and quasi-economists unschooled in and obviously un-
familiar with psychological theory and research are doing playing
psychologist), we anticipate almost insurmountable difficulties in
testing this theory.
Consider, first, attempting to measure rationality directly by
asking the individual decision-maker to judge the rationality of her
decisions. Is it not possible that many will consider all or most of
their decisions to be rational, regardless of how well or poorly these
decisions stack up against some external criterion or are viewed by
some external observer? Alternatively, consider the following indi-
rect approach. Presumably, rational decision-making leads to
maximizing satisfaction. Ignoring whether one measures satisfac-
tion with the decision process or with the outcome of the process
(and the obvious circularity involved), it might be suggested that
one could infer rationality from measuring the individual's level of
satisfaction. If so, would this mean that all decisions that produce
satisfaction are necessarily rational while those decisions that pro-
duce dissatisfaction are necessarily irrational? And what if a par-
ticular decision process and outcome that the individual once
considered to have been exceptionally satisfying is no longer seen
as such by that individual? Does this mean that what once was
determined to be rational is no longer so? For these as well as nu-
merous other reasons (e.g., the well documented problems with
human memory, including those with information retrieval from
125. Posner, supra note 3, at 389.
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memory and memory confabulation, 126 the individual's use of de-
fense mechanisms when assessing and interpreting his motives
and behavior, etc.), we consider reliance upon a subjective determi-
nation of rationality to be particularly troublesome for empirical
assessment. This leaves the possibility of testing Rational Choice
Theory from the vantage point of some external, objective criterion.
As a prerequisite for scientific research, to contend that a
given consumer decision or behavior is irrational, one would first
need to have some agreed upon definition or criterion of what was
and was not rational. Yet, as noted earlier, no such consensus ex-
ists. In the absence of an accepted, agreed upon standard for de-
termining what constitutes rational decision-making and behavior,
does not Rational Choice Theory reduce to untestable theory?
Assume for the moment Rational Choice Theorists would all
agree with Judge Posner's definition of rationality as "choosing the
best means to the chooser's ends." This prompts several questions.
What if the consumer has no understanding of his ends? Or sup-
pose the consumer can identify his ends (e.g., having an interesting
journey travelling from City A to City B), but the route that best
maximizes utility cannot be determined ex ante, but only ex post?
Under these circumstances if, by chance, the consumer happens to
select what he later understands to be the route that best satisfied
his ends, can we contend that this chance selection is a reflection of
rational choice? 127 Or what if (during our ex ante deliberations)
126. Henry L. Roediger, III and Kathleen B. McDermott, Distortions of Mem-
ory, in Oxford Handbook of Memory 149-162 (Fergus I.M. Craik & Endel Tulving
eds., 2000); Ulrich Hoffrage et al., Hindsight Bias: A By-Product of Knowledge Up-
dating?, 26 J. Experimental Psychol: Learning, Memory and Cognition 566 (2000).
127. The day he read Chapter 12 ("The economic approach to law") in Judge
Posner's The Problems of Jurisprudence, this writer was vacationing in southern
France. On the recommendation of the concierge at his hotel, that night, he drove
to Villefranche to have dinner at one of the dozen or so open air sea food restau-
rants that line a 100 yard section of the dock. As a sometimes rational consumer,
he walked the dock, looking at the decor of every restaurant and carefully studying
every menu along the way. After narrowing his choice to three, he selected the
nearest of the three restaurants-a seemingly rational choice, as it lowered his
walking costs by a few steps. Only after sitting down and having broken bread did
he realize he had selected the restaurant that most obscured his view of the water
and surrounding hills, view being an attribute he prizes most highly. Clearly, es-
sentially free information regarding view was available at every one of the restau-
rants stopped at along the dock. To gather this information, he needed only to
turn his back to each of the menus. Yet despite being very deliberate and presum-
ably rational in selecting a restaurant, and despite the fact that view information
was readily accessible at virtually no cost (other than having to turn around), he
CONSUMER RATIONALITY?
we understand that our short term ends conflict with our interme-
diate or long term ends? Or what if there are multiple routes that
may be taken travelling from City A to City B, each possessing
unique costs and benefits, e.g., one route is more scenic while an-
other route takes the traveler through interesting towns? Under
such circumstances (presumably of roughly comparable utility), it
is unclear just what predictions would flow from Rational Choice
Theory.
The Notion of Unconscious Rationality
In addition to stating that "Rational choice need not be con-
scious choice," Judge Posner also writes "rational denotes suiting
means to ends, rather than mulling things over. . ."; i.e., rational
does not necessarily involve thinking (qua "mulling things
over").128 As unconscious choice seemed so fundamentally incon-
sistent with the notion of rational choice, (indeed, many have spent
considerable time and money in and out of therapy wrestling with
their "unconscious irrationalities"), it prompted this writer to con-
sult two dictionaries.
The first definition Webster's, a traditional dictionary, pro-
vides for rational is "having reason or understanding;" the first def-
inition it provides for rationality is "the quality or state of being
rational."129 According to the Dictionary Disk in Microsoft's "En-
carta Reference Suite," the definition of rational includes "showing
evidence of, clear and sensible thinking and judgment, based on
reason" and "understandable in terms that accord with reason and
logic."130
failed to incorporate this valuable information into his utility equation. As a con-
sequence, he definitely did not maximize his satisfaction and ended up having a
less than satisfactory dining experience. As he drove back to his hotel, he realized
that, inasmuch as his ex ante evaluations failed to incorporate his highly valued
view information, he failed to consider all the information it paid him to know (i.e.,
which he "ought" to have acquired). Thus, despite his systematic, deliberate ef-
forts at rationally acquiring and evaluating the readily available information re-
garding each of these options, his means had not been rational and he had behaved
as an irrational actor. At this point, not only was he dissatisfied with his meal, but
also with his irrational behavior. Of course, that was not the first time he had
acted irrationally, nor would it be the last.
128. See Posner, supra note 3, at 354.
129. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 969 (10th ed. 1996).
130. Microsoft Encarta Reference Suite 2000.
2000]
132 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:81
When it comes to defining unconscious, Webster's definitions
include: "not marked by conscious thought, sensation or feeling"
and "not consciously planned or deliberately carried out."' 13 The
definitions of unconscious on the Dictionary Disk in Microsoft's
"Encarta Reference Suite" include "unaware: not aware of some-
thing; unintentional: not intended, or not realized or
recognized." 132
According to our understanding, "mulling things over" and
"showing evidence of clear and sensible thinking" have meanings
that are incompatible with "not marked by conscious thought." As
it is accomplished without understanding, unconscious choice can
be and often is inconsistent with and, indeed, the antithesis of, ra-
tional choice. 133
The bottom line: We have great difficulty understanding how,
as currently conceptualized, Judge Posner's definition of rational/
rationality can be operationalized. Without specifying a criterion,
we tend to think that the concept and accompanying theory are
rendered incapable of solid empirical study or support. As things
stand now, virtually any finding or behavior can be interpreted
and classified as being rational or irrational, depending upon the
unique perspective of the classifier. This situation presents a criti-
cal impediment to scientific advance.
B. Information Acquisition and Rational Behavior
We agree with Judge Posner's observation that: "Rationality
does not imply omniscience. Indeed, it would be profoundly irra-
tional to spend all one's time in the acquisition of information."13 4
Research shows that, operating under conditions that have both
financial and ego consequences and where information acquisition
costs are virtually zero, even professional security analysts decid-
131. Webster's, supra note 129, at 1273.
132. Microsoft, supra note 130.
133. One reviewer remarked that Judge Posner might contend his definition
was his definition, and dictionary definitions of these terms possessed little or no
relevance. Yet this writer cannot envision Judge Posner adopting such a position,
as it would align him with the Humpty Dumpty in C. L. Dogson's (a.k.a. Lewis
Carroll) whimsical tale, Through the Looking Glass, who held "when I use a word
... it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." Lewis Carroll,
Through the Looking Glass 79 (Macmillan 1966) (1871).
134. Posner, supra note 2, at 1553.
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ing on which securities to select do not acquire most (or even much)
of the information available.13 5
Judge Posner holds "it would be profoundly irrational to spend
all one's time in the acquisition of information."138 However, in
this information age, it is widely accepted that information has
value. Thus, other Rational Choice Theorists might assume that
acquiring more information cannot help but yield more value and
thereby lead to better decision-making. The more information one
possesses, the greater the likelihood of acquiring information it
pays one to know and therefore one ought to acquire, and the bet-
ter decision one can make; how could it be otherwise? Again, con-
siderable research reveals that, up to a point, as the amount of
information acquired increases, consumers do make better deci-
sions (where "better" is defined in terms of each respondent's per-
sonal, previously measured, utilities). However, beyond that point,
acquiring more information leads consumers to make poorer deci-
sions.137 In other words, when it comes to making decisions, more
information is not necessarily better, and sometimes may be con-
siderably worse.
Moreover, the amount of information acquired is not the
only-nor often the most-important consideration. Research
shows that the content (type) of the acquired information' 38 and
especially the sequence in which this information is acquired 139
can be as or more important than how much information is ac-
135. See Jacob Jacoby et al., Effectiveness of Security Analyst Information Ac-
cessing Strategies: A Computer Interactive Assessment, 1 Computer Hum. Behav.
95 (1985); Jacob Jacoby et al., When Feedback is Ignored: The Disutility of Outcome
Feedback, 69 J. Applied Psychol. 531 (1984); see also Jacob Jacoby et al, New Di-
rections in Behavioral Process Research: Implications for Social Psychology, 23 J.
Exper. Soc. Psychol. 146 (1987) (discussing information gathering sequences that
differentiate between better versus poorer performing security analysts).
136. Posner, supra note 2, at 1553.
137. See Jacob Jacoby et al., Brand Choice Behavior as a Function of Informa-
tion Load, 11 J. Marketing Res. 63, 63-69 (1974); Jacob Jacoby et al., Brand Choice
Behavior as a Function of Information Load: Replication and Extension, 1 J. Cons.
Res 40 (1974); Jacob Jacoby, Information Load and Decision Quality: Some Con-
tested Issues, 14 J. Marketing Res. 569, 569-73 (1977); Jacob Jacoby, Perspectives
on Information Overload, 10 J. Cons. Res. 432, 432-35 (1984).
138. See Jacob Jacoby et al., Effectiveness of Security Analyst Information Ac-
cessing Strategies: A Computer Interactive Assessment, 1 Computer Hum. Behav.
107 (1985).
139. See Jacob Jacoby et al., New Directions in Behavioral Process Research:
Implications for Social Psychology, 23 J. Exper. Soc. Psychol. 171 (1987); see gener-
ally Solomon E. Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J. Abnor. Psychol.
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quired. How does Rational Choice Theory accommodate the fact
that when professional security analysts working to maximize fi-
nancial performance acquire the same information in a different
sequence, this one difference may exert dramatic impact on the de-
cision quality and performance?
C. Relying on the Assumption of Randomness to Trivialize
Irrationality
Judge Posner relies on the concept of randomness to explain
why "the fact that people are not always rational, even that some
are irrational most or all of the time, is not in itself a challenge to
rational-choice economists."140 According to Judge Posner:
Most questions economists ask concern aggregate rather than
individual behavior..... Suppose [a] tax increase [on ciga-
rettes] is two percent and rational smokers respond by reduc-
ing their purchase of cigarettes by an average of one percent,
while the irrational ones respond randomly .... If the distri-
bution of these random behaviors has the same mean as the
rational smokers' reaction to the tax, the effect of the tax on
the quantity demanded of cigarettes will be identical to what
it would be if all cigarette consumers were rational. And this
is true no matter what fraction of cigarette consumers is
irrational. 141
Given closer scrutiny, we believe this seemingly rational ex-
planation fails. Consider, first, the following distributions, where
each number represents a different decision (either by an individ-





258 (1946) (applying these factors in determining individual impressions of
personality).
140. Posner, supra note 2, at 1554.
141. Id. at 1556-57; see also Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic
Theory, 70 J. Pol. Econ. 1, 4 (1962) (making a similar argument: "[Niegatively in-
clined market demand curves result not so much from rational behavior per se as
from a general principle which includes a wide class of irrational behaviors as
well.").
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Assume that "3" represents rationality while the other numbers
represent departures from rationality, with greater distances from
3 representing greater departures. In Distribution A, all five deci-
sions reflect rationality. In contrast, in Distribution B, only one
out of five decisions reflect rationality while, to varying degrees,
four out of five (80%) do not. In Distribution C, none of the ten
decisions reflects anything close to rationality. Yet in all three dis-
tributions, the distribution average is 3, or perfect rationality.
Now consider Distribution D, which begins to approximate a
normal distribution. Again, though the mean is 3 (rationality), a
greater percentage of the ten decisions (60%) reflect non-rational-
ity of varying degrees.
D. 1,2,2,3,3,3,3,4,4,5
It is relatively easy to develop large-scale distributions illus-
trating little or no rationality. Without becoming overly compli-
cated, consider the following, where perfect rationality is captured
by a 6. Though it depicts thirty independent decisions, not a single
one of the values in Distribution G represents rationality.
E. 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6,6
F. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
G. 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 8, 8,
8, 8, 9, 9, 9, 10, 10, 11
Indeed, Distribution G is reminiscent of the following apocryphal
story. During the Korean War, as the Chinese and North Koreans
poured across the Yalu River and every man was needed for com-
bat, two statisticians were called up to the front. After being told
to focus on a tree stump and shoot at anything that moved, then
seeing some movement, both fired their rifles where they had seen
movement. One shot kicked up dust to the left of the stump while
the other kicked up dust an equivalent distance to the right of the
stump. Having seen the two dust swirls, the statisticians stood up,
shook hands, and exclaimed: "Well, I guess we got
him"-whereupon both became vulnerable to enemy fire from be-
hind the stump!
Just as it was dangerous for the statisticians to deduce that
their average meant that they had confirmed their hypothesis, it is
similarly risky for Rational Choice Theorists to argue that because
the average of a random distribution supports the theory, Rational
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Choice Theory is supported. In the case of Distribution F, only one
out of eleven predictions (or 9%) is confirmed; in the case of Distri-
bution G, none out of thirty predictions are confirmed. It cannot be
claimed that because the theory is supported "on average," it is
supported "in general," and we believe few experienced scientists
would claim confirmation of a theory under such circumstances.
As the averages of these distributions reveal, in the absence of
any genuine understanding or explanatory power, it is possible to
have high predictive accuracy. One of many amusing illustrations
of this fact is the "Super Bowl theory" of stock market performance.
It holds "that if a team from the old National Football League wins
the Super Bowl, stocks will rise over the next year. But if a team
from the old American Football League prevails, the stock market
is in for trouble."142 As of the time that passage was written
(1998), the predictive accuracy was twenty-seven out of thirty-one
years, or 87%. Thus, until and unless our plausible alternative hy-
pothesis (namely, the average reveals only that, even in the ab-
sence of any genuine understanding or explanatory power, it is
possible to have predictive accuracy) can be shown to be false, it
seems risky to rely on group averages to claim that Rational
Choice Theory was "confirmed."
Of course, it might be argued that rationality is not an all or
nothing affair. According to this approach, given a normal distribu-
tion, rationality might reasonably be held to be best described as a
range (say, +/- one standard deviation) around the mean. This sug-
gests that instead of being "perfectly rational," most decisions-68%
or so-can be considered "reasonably rational." Aside from wonder-
ing why we need Rational Choice Theorists to tell us this, one is
left to ponder what such an argument does to Rational Choice The-
ory, with its emphasis on maximization.
142. Floyd Norris, The Continued Rise of the Market Rests in the Hands of the
Super Bowl Team From Green Bay, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1998, at Dll. The author
writes:
this columnist decided that it made at least as much sense to assume that
the stock market could forecast a football game as it did to assume that a
football game could forecast the stock market. The fact that both were
absurd was not seen as a deterrent. [Thus,] if the stock market rose from
the end of November to the Super Bowl, then the team whose city appears
later in the alphabet will win.
Id. This hypothesis was confirmed in twenty of the preceding twenty-three years,
also 87% of the time.
CONSUMER RATIONALITY?
Though assuming randomness may be convenient, when em-
ployed without supporting data, such an assumption is suspect in
many important ways. As examples, the distributions of wealth
and annual income-important economic factors that can be ex-
pected to interact with and influence how consumers react to price
changes-are decidedly non-normal. While it may be convenient
to assume randomness, when said assumption is amenable to em-
pirical confirmation, doing so becomes an essential part of the sci-
entific process. Consider Judge Posner's cigarette tax example: If
"the irrational ones respond randomly [and if] the distribution of
these random behaviors has the same mean as the rational smok-
ers' reaction to the task .... ."14 3While convenient, one would hope
that if and when such sequentially contingent assumptions are of-
fered for consideration in litigated matters, they would be accom-
panied by supporting data. Having often proffered opinions in
litigated matters, this writer well appreciates that failing to pro-
vide empirical support for the key assumptions underlying his
opinions leaves them vulnerable to a trier of fact concluding that
they are predicated on "junk science," something rightly considered
impermissible and inadmissible under recent Supreme Court rul-
ings.'" One would trust that, if and when its propositions are
proffered or relied upon in litigated matters, the same requirement
for scientific rigor would apply to evaluating the key assumptions
underlying Rational Choice Theory.
As Judge Posner notes: "We now know that if we give a diffi-
cult legal question to two equally distinguished [and, presumably,
equally rational] legal thinkers, chosen at random, we may well get
opposite answers."1 45 Here we have "randomness." Here we have
the rational deliberations of means to an end by two equally distin-
guished legal thinkers. But is it a rational outcome when the deci-
sions reached under these circumstances are diametrically
opposed? (And if, so, according to what generally accepted
criterion?)
Last and perhaps most importantly, needing to rely on the no-
tion of randomness to support Rational Choice Theory seems fun-
143. Posner, supra note 2, at 1556.
144. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); General Electric
Co. v. Joiner, 552 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993).
145. Posner supra note 3, at 428 (emphasis added).
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damentally inconsistent with the emphasis on "all people... in all
of their activities..."146 We have difficulty understanding how it
can be asserted that one's theory applies to "all people in all their
activities" and simultaneously hold "the fact that people are not
always rational most or all of the time even that some are irra-
tional most or all of the time, is not in itself a challenge to rational-
choice [theory]." 14 7 Or is the ability to steadfastly hold both pro-
positions a consequence of the fact that "economic theory has be-
come so rich, so complex, that almost any hypothesis, even one that
appeared to deny a fundamental implication of the theory,...
could be made to conform to the theory"148? Among scientists, it is
generally accepted that inconsistent theory is invalid theory.149
D. Relying on the Assumption of Non-Randomness to Trivialize
Irrationality
While Judge Posner is comfortable employing the assumption
of randomness to defend Rational Choice Theory, he appears un-
comfortable when behavioral economists rely upon the same as-
sumption. Consider the following:
[Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler] make exaggerated claims for the
empirical robustness of behavioral economics. The problem
of extrapolating to normal human behavior from behavior in
unusual experimental settings ... is obvious... One would
like to know the theoretical or empirical basis for supposing
that the experimental environment is relatively similar to the
real world. That would be the first question an experimental
scientist would address. Selection effects suggest that the ex-
perimental and real-world environment will differ systemati-
cally. The experimental subjects are chosen more or less
randomly; but people are not randomly sorted to jobs and
146. Id. at 353.
147. Posner, supra note 2, at 1554 (emphasis added).
148. Posner, supra note 3, at 363-64.
149. A colleague who reviewed an earlier version of this paper wrote:
Here, it seems to me that your refutation is a good one but does not really
capture the absurdity of the judge's supposition. If we suppose the ra-
tional folks reduce purchases by 1% while the irrational folks, on average,
also reduce purchases by 1% (albeit with a larger variance), then at the
aggregate level both responses are in some sense the same. But a 1% re-
duction is NOT a random response. It's a systematic tendency with error
variance. The judge's statement is a statistical mess and doesn't deserve
to be taken as seriously as you proceed to take it.... this leaves you in the
position of battling... against an argument that is absurd to begin with.
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other activities. People who cannot calculate probabilities
will either avoid gambling, if they know their cognitive weak-
nesses, or, if they do not, will be wiped out and thus forced to
discontinue gambling. People who are unusually "fair" will
avoid (or, again, be forced out of) roughhouse activi-
ties-including highly competitive businesses, trial lawyering
and the academic rat race. 150
This passage cited is pregnant with meaning. Consistent with
other comments Judge Posner has made regarding experimental
design, 151 asserting that determining whether "the experimental
environment is relatively similar to the real world.. .would be the
first question an experimental scientist would address" reveals an
imperfect understanding of experimental design and how it is ap-
plied. It is widely accepted across the sciences that "full" (as op-
posed to "quasi"15 2) experimentation is the optimal research design
for testing causal propositions. Judge Posner is correct in not-
ingl5 3 that being able to unambiguously contend it was the
changes in variable X that caused the observed changes in variable
Y, and not changes in or the influence of some other variable, is the
essential challenge of experimentation. To the extent that one is
able to rule out plausible alternative explanations (to the effect
that, it was not changes in variable X but something else that
caused the changes in variable Y), the experiment is said to pos-
150. Posner, supra note 2, at 1570.
151. See Posner, supra note 3, at 65 ("'Controlled' experiments suppress fea-
tures of the natural environment that are deemed irrelevant, in order to isolate the
effect of the variable under investigation."); see also Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Met-
ropolitan Baltimore Football Club Ltd. P'ship, 34 F.3d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1994)
(discussing why "field" or "natural world" experiments need not require suppres-
sion of a single feature of the natural environment).
152. The most sophisticated discussion of experimental design (qua data collec-
tion strategy) is found in the works of Thomas D. Cook and Donald T. Campbell.
Examples include: Cook & Campbell, supra note 41; Thomas D. Cook et al., Quasi-
Experimentation, in Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 491-
576 (Marvin D. Dunnette & Leaetta M. Hough eds., 1990). A considerably abbrevi-
ated description of the rudiments of experimental design prepared expressly for
the needs of practicing attorneys may be found in Jacob Jacoby, Experimental De-
signs in Deceptive Advertising and Claims Substantiation Research, in Advances
in Claims Substantiation 119-41 (Cynthia M. Hampton-Sosa ed., 1991). The latter
article has been reprinted in False Advertising and the Law (Jeffrey S. Edelstein
ed., 1996). A briefer discussion may be found in David H. Kaye & David A. Freed-
man. Reference Guide on Statistics, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence,
331, 346-50 (1994).
153. See Posner, supra note 3, at 65.
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sess a high degree of "internal validity."154 In contrast, the ability
to extrapolate from an experiment's findings to the world beyond is
limited by the experiment's "external validity." A different set of
plausible explanations limit external validity. 155
In different ways, "selection" has the potential to affect both
internal and external validity. With respect to "internal validity,"
if the individuals selected for the test (experimental) group differ
in a systematic way from the individuals selected for the control
group, then a plausible alternative explanation for one's findings
might be that it was the differences in the people assigned to the
two groups, not the changes in variable X that caused the observed
changes in variable Y. To remove this possibility, respondents se-
lected for an experiment need to be randomly assigned to the test
and control groups. Random assignment enables us to conclude
that what the experimenter did, and not differences across the re-
spondents in the two groups, was the cause of the observed effect.
"Random assignment," however, is not the same thing as "ran-
dom selection." While random assignment refers to how, once se-
lected, the respondents were assigned to the test and control
conditions, random selection pertains to our ability to generalize
from the experiment to the world beyond. It poses the question:
"Were the respondents (used in both the test and control groups)
been selected in a manner that makes them representative of the
respondents in the world beyond to whom we wish to apply our
findings?" The best way to assure such representativeness is to
randomly select respondents from the population of interest.
Given that our experiment uses respondents representative of the
population of interest, we can be much more confident that our
findings can be validly extrapolated to the population of interest.
Importantly, even when applied to assessing causation in the real
world, internal validity is acknowledged to be more important than
external validity.156 Thus, "insuring that "the experimental envi-
ronment is relatively similar to the real world" clearly is not "the
first question an experimental scientist would ask." 57
154. See Cook & Campbell, supra note 41, at 50-59.
155. See id. at 73-74.
156. See generally id. at 83 (stating: "[Tihe primacy of internal validity should
be noted for both basic and applied researchers").
157. More serious instances of Judge Posner's flawed understanding of experi-
mental design are revealed in Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore
Football Club Ltd. Pship, 34 F.3d 410 (1994).
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Judge Posner's criticism regarding the "empirical robustness
of behavioral economics" pertains to external validity. Essentially,
the judge is conjecturing that, by selecting respondents randomly,
the researchers do not represent people who calculate probabili-
ties. This reasoning permits this writer to understand why he
terms the findings "cognitive quirks that belong to cognitive psy-
chology." 158 As we see it, the hysteron proteron used by Judge Pos-
ner is that, because they may be able to calculate probabilities,
those who rise to the top in competitive "roughhouse" domains are
relatively free of cognitive "quirks" and irrationalities. This under-
standing suggests that Judge Posner believes the findings on these
cognitive effects are not sufficiently robust to apply to such high-
functioning people. What Judge Posner does not recognize is that,
just as people with J.D.s, L.L.D.s and Ph.Ds are almost as likely as
high school graduates to miscomprehend the basic material mean-
ings in TV programs and mass media magazine communica-
tions,15 9 the cognitive quirks identified in the scholarly literature
apply to us all.
The cognitive quirks that Judge Posner suggests possess ques-
tionable "empirical robustness" have been established, confirmed
and re-confirmed via the application of experimental designs
(which, according to virtually all scientists, are the preferred meth-
odology for assessing causal relationships 60 ). However, as Judge
Posner acknowledges, "Falsifiability is placed still farther beyond
the economist's reach by the infeasibility in most areas of economic
inquiry of performing controlled experiments." 16 1 This being so,
Rational Choice Theorists seem precariously positioned to question
the empirical robustness of findings reported in the cognitive psy-
chological literature.
No empirical (or, for that matter, conceptual) investigation can
capture the "real world" in all its blooming, buzzing complexity. Of
necessity, tradeoffs and limitations are a part of all research.
Though understanding this to be so,' 62 Judge Posner's comments
regarding the empirical robustness of behavioral economic theory
158. Posner, supra note 2, at 1558.
159. See Jacoby & Hoyer, supra note 84, at 80-81, 115-19.
160. See Kaye & Freedman, supra note 152, at 347.
161. Posner, supra note 3, at 364.
162. See generally Indianapolis Colts, 34 F.3d at 415 (stating "Trials would be
very short if only perfect evidence were admissible").
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remind this writer of post-concert criticism to the effect that "the
pianist had a weak fourth finger." In point of fact, every pianist
has (and therefore can be criticized for having) a weak fourth fin-
ger-if not on the left, then on the right hand. Within the scientific
community, it is well accepted that empirical robustness is
achieved when findings are replicated by different scientists using
different methods, different respondents, different measuring in-
struments, different situations, etc. 163 In other words, robustness
is achieved by multiple overlapping replications. In this respect,
most of the so-called "cognitive quirks" have achieved and earned
"empirically robust" status. On the other hand, we have yet to
come across hard (i.e., non-correlational, but causal) research
showing that Rational Choice Theory is as empirically robust.
E. "Behavioral Man Behaves in Unpredictable Ways"
In contrasting the predictive efficiency of Rational Choice The-
ory with that of behavioral economics, Judge Posner writes:
The rational-choice economist asks what "rational man"
would do in a given situation, and usually the answer is
pretty clear and it can be compared with actual behavior to
see whether the prediction is confirmed. Sometimes it is not
confirmed-and so we have behavioral economics. But it is
profoundly unclear what "behavioral man" would do in any
given situation. He is a compound of rational and irrational
capacities and impulses. He might do anything. [Jolls, Sun-
stein and Thaler] have neither a causal account of behavioral
man nor a model of his decisional structure. 164
In his penultimate paragraph, Judge Posner re-emphasizes this
theme: "Behavioral man behaves in unpredictable ways. Dare we
vest responsibility for curing irrationality in the irrational?"165
Given the effects credited to Reagan economics-according to
which important predictions either failed to be made or, when
made, often failed to be confirmed-it would appear that the ques-
tion, "Dare we vest responsibility for curing irrationality in the ir-
rational?" might just as well be applied to Rational Choice
163. See, e.g., Lee J. Cronbach et al., The Dependability of Behavioral Measure-
ments: Theory of Generalizability for Scores and Profiles (1972).
164. Posner, supra note 2, at 1559. Beyond claiming this is so, where is the
hard evidence showing that when its causal propositions are properly tested, it is
only "sometimes" that rational Choice Theory is not confirmed?
165. Id. at 1575.
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economists. Indeed, is this not why economics is sometimes re-
ferred to as "the dismal science"?
As Mark Twain commented upon hearing reports of his de-
mise, the claims of behavioral man's unpredictability are highly
exaggerated. Indeed, if the reference to "actual behavior" is meant
to encompass all human (including non-economic) behavior, one
could just as easily contend that the behavioral scientist asks what
'behavioral man' would do in a given situation, and usually the an-
swer is pretty clear and it can be compared with actual behavior to
see whether the prediction is confirmed. Sometimes it is not con-
firmed. 16 We can predict that when attending a Harvard-Yale
football game, in the vast majority of instances, a graduate of Yale
will choose to root for Yale and a graduate of Harvard will choose
to root for Harvard. Only in some special circumstances (e.g.,
when one has degrees from both Yale and Harvard) does prediction
become muddied. Even in these instances, additional information
(e.g., where was the undergraduate degree obtained?) sometimes
makes prediction easier. Of course there are exceptions. By the
same token, do not a comparable number of offsetting exceptions
pertain to economic theory? One may ask: Just what additional
understanding does Rational Choice Theory bring to understand-
ing the choices made in this situation?
During the presentation upon which this paper is based, the
author posed the rhetorical question: "Is behavioral man really so
unpredictable?" He then asked the audience to participate in a
brief word-association task. Upon mentioning a word, all members
of the audience were asked to write down the first word that came
to their minds. Excluding most chemical, biological and other tech-
nical terms, the English language contains approximately 700,000
basic words. Thus, the probability of a member of the audience
coming up with a particular word should be 1 in 700,000. Yet in
response to his saying "chair," nearly 90% of the audience wrote
down "table." In response to asking for "the name of the first
flower that comes to your mind," approximately 50% of the audi-
ence wrote down "rose." This was during the month of April. Had
the latter question been asked on or during the week immediately
preceding February 14th, one could predict there would be an even
higher rate of "rose" responses. Though these behavioral predic-
166. See id. at 1559.
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tions can be confirmed with audience after audience, one suspects
that Rational Choice Theory has no ability to predict such behav-
ior. Accordingly, the opinion that it is "profoundly unclear what
'behavioral man' would do in any given situation" cannot be sup-
ported. 167 Just as clearly, it is "profoundly unclear what 'economic/
rational man' would do in [miany given situation[s]" when these
"situations" are meant to encompass all forms of human behavior
and relationships. 168
Of course, there are exceptions-10% of the audience selected a
word other than "table" and approximately 50% selected a flower
other than a rose. So behavioral science has an imperfect track
record when it comes to making accurate predictions. But is Ra-
tional Choice Theory any better? To assert that, for Rational
Choice Theory, "the answer is pretty clear and it can be compared
with actual behavior to see whether the prediction is confirmed"
but that the same is not true with regard to behavioral man seems
to be an insupportable stretch. Indeed, we suspect the balance has
not shifted since Herbert A. Simon wrote: "in the limited range of
situtations where the two theories have been compared... the
[psychological] learning theories appear to account for the ob-
served behavior better than do the [economic] theories of rational
behavior."169
F. On Dispelling "Quirky Irrational Tendencies"
In his concluding paragraph, Judge Posner comments: "One
might have thought that behavioral economics had at least one
clear normative implication: that efforts should be made through
education and perhaps psychiatry to cure the cognitive quirks and
weaknesses of will that prevent people from acting rationally .....
All their [Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler's] suggestions for legal reform
are of devices for getting around, rather than dispelling, our irra-
tional tendencies... 170
As noted, our reading thus far suggests that much attention
has been focussed on the judgment and evaluation literature.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice, 63 Psychol. Rev. 129, 129 (1956); see
David M. Dreman & Eric A. Lulkin, Investor Overreaction: Evidence That Its Basis
is Psychological, 1 J. Psychol. & Fin. Markets 61 (2000).
170. Posner, supra note 2, at 1575.
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Though important, this work represents but a stream, not the river
of relevant findings in cognitive psychology, much less the ocean of
pertinent literature in psychology and the other behavioral sci-
ences. Large numbers of counter-intuitive and seemingly irrational
thinking and behavior have been found, confirmed and re-con-
firmed in these other realms as well. As but a few examples: Is it
rational to judge things as being lighter in color when they appear
against a dark background vs. when the same items appear
against a lighter background? Is it rational for consumers to rely
on the color of a package or the pronouncements of paid celebrity
spokespersons to judge a product's quality?171 Not really-but
they do. Is it rational for consumers to have unreasonably high
expectations for products or services, then be dissatisfied when
their expectations are not met? Is it rational for survey respon-
dents to have a greater tendency to answer "yes" than "no," regard-
less of the question being asked? When it comes to answering
survey questions or making choices (such as when voting for candi-
dates listed alphabetically), is it rational for people to exhibit pri-
macy, recency or serial position effects, 172 so that candidates
whose names appear first or last on a ballot tend to have a built-in
advantage.
Hardly an issue of the Journal of Consumer Psychology, the
Journal of Consumer Research, or the Journal of Marketing Re-
search goes by without at least an article or two providing addi-
tional evidence on the pervasiveness of "cognitive quirks" or
suggesting how an all-encompassing Rational Choice Theory would
likely be inapplicable in the real world of individual consumer be-
havior. Examples of both appear in the most recent issue of the
Journal of Marketing Research. The abstract of one article reads:
The authors examine the effects of using a subtractive versus
an additive option-framing method on consumers' option
171. Here we mean situations where the celebrity has no special expertise
(such as when Michael Jordan promotes MCI) as opposed to when the spokesper-
son's expertise is directly relevant (as when Michael Jordan promotes Nike ath-
letic shoes).
172. Termed "order effects," they typically surface across different realms of
content. A "primacy" effect occurs when a person learns, is influenced by or selects
an option simply because it comes first. As the name implies, a "recency" effect is
the reverse. A "serial position effect" occurs when the beginning and end of a se-
ries of items or communications are learned first (as when a two-year old asked to
recite the alphabet says something like "A, B, C, D, E, K, 0, W, X, Y, Z"), best or
are more persuasive.
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choice decisions in three studies. The former option-framing
method presents consumers with a fully loaded product and
asks them to delete options they do not want. The latter
presents them with a base model and asks them to add the
options they do want. Combined, the studies support the
managerial attractiveness of subtractive versus additive op-
tion framing. Consumers tend to choose more options with a
higher total option price when they use subtractive versus ad-
ditive option framing. This effect holds across different op-
tion price levels and product categories of varying price.
Moreover, the effect is magnified when subjects are asked to
anticipate regret from their option choice decisions. 173
The second article 7 4 has implications for how, in the interest
of maximizing profits and maintaining or enhancing brand equity,
management needs to respond when consumers hear "product-
harm" reports. As an example of such reports, the authors cite an
Economist article 175 regarding "the recent consumer outrage at
contaminated Coca-Cola cans in Belgium and France and the sub-
sequent ineffective corporate response." 76 Summarizing their
findings from a field survey and two experiments, these authors
conclude: "From a managerial perspective, the result that consum-
ers' interpretation of [a]... firm['s] response is moderated by their
prior expectations about the firm indicates that an identical re-
sponse [by the firm] can have dramatically different effects on
brand equity, depending upon consumers' prior expectations about
the firm." 77 In other words, the rational response of management
will be interpreted differently by different consumers, depending
upon the expectations held by the latter. Is this rational? When
providing information to the public in the effort to put out the fires
created by reports of product harm, what is management to do?
Literally thousands of additional examples can be supplied.
Labeling these "quirks" (defined as "a peculiar trait, idiosyncrasy,
173. C. Whan Park et al., Choosing What I Want Versus Rejecting What I Do
Not Want: An Application of Decision Framing to Product Option Choice Decisions,
27 J. Marketing Res. 187 (2000).
174. See Niraj Dawar & Madan M. Pillutla, Impact of Product-Harm Crises on
Brand Equity: The Moderating Role of Consumer Expectations, 27 J. Marketing
Res. 215 (2000).
175. See Coca Cola: Bad for You, Economist June 19, 1999, at 62-63.
176. Dawar & Pillutla, supra note 174, at 215.
177. Id. at 224.
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accident, vagary"178) is to misrepresent their pervasive presence as
part and parcel of the human condition. From a behavioral scien-
tist's perspective, it would be naive to believe that education or
therapy would be sufficient to dispel such deep-rooted irrational
tendencies. As many of these so-called "cognitive quirks and weak-
nesses of will" go unrecognized by educators and skilled therapists
alike, it is doubtful whether years of education or therapy would
have any effect, much less the desired effect.
For example, consider educating the population regarding the
well-documented tendency for respondents to be "acquiescent" and
"yea-saying" when answering closed-ended survey questions. Far
from being a trivial matter, this tendency has important implica-
tions for public referenda and public policy when said policy is
predicated upon survey findings. Given that yea-saying can intro-
duce error into a survey's results, leading to misinformed policy-
maker decision-making, what should be done? Right now, compe-
tent researchers understand how to design questions to minimize
such tendencies or to assess their effect. Imagine, however, trying
to educate and train the population to guard against yea-saying.
By sensitizing them to this irrational tendency, do we dispel it (if
so, for all, some, or a few people) or simply end up modifying it in
unknown and immeasurable ways? That is, being so sensitized, we
can expect some not to care, and others to care and (to greater or
lesser degrees) try to control their tendency to agree. How would
we know whether the latter individuals were successful, or even
who they were? A reduction of the percent of "yes" answers might
signify some effect or simply that, in an effort to control their irra-
tional tendencies, some respondents have now become more likely
to respond "no" when they have no firm opinion (producing a con-
sistent nay-saying effect).
Consider another example. Though it would not appear to re-
flect rational evaluation and response, there is a highly significant
difference in the degree of positivity/negativity expressed by con-
sumers when survey questions are phrased "Do you agree or disa-
gree. . ." versus "Do you disagree or agree...", or when a response
scale is labeled from +1 to +7 as opposed to +7 to +1.179 Given this
178. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, supra note 129, at 960.
179. See David A. Sheluga et al, Whether to Agree-Disagree or Disagree-Agree:
The Effects of Anchor Order on Item Response, in 5 Advances in Consumer Re-
search 109-13 (H. Keith Hunt ed., 1978).
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propensity, just what would education or therapy seek to have the
consumer do? The bottom line is that while education and therapy
may have some effect at the margins, in an experience not uncom-
mon for economists, they are more likely not to produce any sub-
stantial impact in the desired direction.
G. "The Question of Theory"
Under the rubric "The Question of Theory," this author was
surprised to find that Judge Posner acknowledges that the picture
painted by Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler "may be a psychologically
realistic picture of the average person, and it responds to the famil-
iar complaint that 'economic man' is unrecognizable in real life.
But in theory making, descriptive accuracy is purchased at a price,
the price being loss of predictive power."180 Judge Posner contin-
ues: "JST have neither a causal account of behavioral man nor a
model of his decision structure."18 ' This same theme is echoed in
Judge Posner's The Problems of Jurisprudence:8 2
Should the weakness of economics discourage attempts to ap-
ply economics to nonmarket behavior? Surely not. Although
much nonmarket behavior is indeed baffling, this is so
whether one approaches it from the standpoint of economics,
which assumes that human beings behave rationally, or from
the standpoint of other human sciences, which do not make
the assumption but have nothing to put in its place. 183
It seems odd to find Judge Posner arguing that, because behavioral
economists "have neither a causal account of behavioral man nor a
model of his decision structure" and, hence, "have nothing to put in
[Rational Choice Theory's] place," the criticisms behavioral econo-
mists have of Rational Choice Theory merit little weight. Odd be-
cause Judge Posner is the same author who urged readers of
Problems of Jurisprudence:
180. Posner, supra note 2, at 1559.
181. Id.
182. See Posner, supra note 3, at 367.
183. See id. (emphasis added). Parenthetically, it is clear that Judge Posner
believes economics is "the strongest of the human sciences." Id. at 366. However,
while economics arguably may be the most quantitative of the human sciences, by
themselves, mathematical sophistication, quantitative modeling and number
crunching are not to be confused with strong (qua valid) science. The two may be
completely independent. Accordingly, in the absence of supporting evidence, we
respectfully disagree with Judge Posner's opinion to the effect that economics is
the "strongest of the human sciences."
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to attend to the particulars of my analysis [and if] having
done so, they still conclude that the ratio of destructive to
constructive criticism is too high, I ask them to ponder
Voltaire's reply when he was taken to task for offering no sub-
stitute for Christianity, which he had attacked: 'I save you
from a ferocious beast and you ask me what you replace it
with!'. 184
Having acknowledged that the picture painted by Jolls, Sunstein
and Thaler "may be a psychologically realistic picture of the aver-
age person, and it responds to the familiar complaint that 'eco-
nomic man' is unrecognizable in real life,"1 8 5 is it that difficult to
accept that Rational Choice Theory may represent some sort of
"beast" from which we merit being saved? At which point does
Rational Choice Theory become Rationalized Choice Theory?
Under the same rubric ("The Question of Theory"), after refer-
ring to what he views as "the undertheorization of behavioral eco-
nomics," Judge Posner writes:
JST may have overlooked the distinction between a descrip-
tion and a theory because they confuse explanation and pre-
diction. It's easy to formulate a theory that will explain, in
the sense of subsume, all observations within its domain,
however anomalous they are from another theoretical stand-
point.... [Ihf rational-choice theory bumps up against some
example of irrational behavior, the example can be accommo-
dated by changing the theory to allow for irrational behavior.
But there is no greater gain in predictive power...186
It appears that Judge Posner believes, mistakenly, that pre-
diction and predictive power represent the Holy Grail of scientific
endeavor. In contrast, if there is a Holy Grail, we believe most
scientists would agree that it lies in developing empirically sup-
portable and supported explanations (particularly causal explana-
tions) that provide valid understanding of the world about us.
(The issue of "description" is moot as, regardless of whether one's
focus is prediction or explanation, description is an essential pre-
requisite. It provides the necessary foundation for theory and
measurement. Without adequate description, one can have
neither adequate theory nor adequate measurement. Both predic-
184. Id. at 33.
185. Posner, supra note 2, at 1559.
186. Id. at 1560.
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tion and explanation necessarily rely upon clear descriptions of
their predictor-criterion or independent-dependent variables.)
More importantly, prediction may but need not imply under-
standing. As illustrated by the "Super Bowl theory" of stock mar-
ket performance described earlier, high predictive power can be
devoid of any genuine understanding and only provide the illusion
of understanding. Though we may be reading more into the state-
ment than its author intended, acknowledging that the picture
painted by Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler "may be a psychologically
realistic picture of the average person, and it responds to the famil-
iar complaint that 'economic man' is unrecognizable in real life"18 7
suggests, to us, at least implicit recognition that Rational Choice
Theory may provide little more than illusory understanding.
It is not surprising to find one taken with prediction claiming
to adopt a "behaviorist" perspective. "The economic perspective is
thoroughly (and fruitfully) behaviorist." 1s Further: "Law itself is
best approached in behaviorist terms."18 9 Psychologists and mar-
keters of earlier eras also thought that the behaviorist perspective
was "the answer." This perspective was the dominant one among
empirically oriented psychologists during the early part of the 20th
Century. It fell out of favor by the 1930s, as research findings
made other perspectives more compelling. The behaviorist perspec-
tive was also the dominant orientation of professional, profit-maxi-
mizing marketing managers through the mid- to late1950s. Near
the end of that period, with the need not only to predict, but also to
influence and shape consumer behavior, they began recognizing
the importance and practical utility of understanding and explain-
ing the workings of the consumer's mind. Though still important,
prediction was relegated to a secondary role behind explaining and
attempting to verify causal propositions.
187. Id. at 1559.
188. Posner, supra note 3, at 382.
189. Id. at 456. It seems to us that a theory that relies upon "satisfaction" (an
internal mental state not amenable to direct external observation) as its principal
explanatory variable cannot be said to be compatible with a pure behaviorist ap-
proach, as the latter is an externally oriented approach that ignores internal
variables.
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H. When Rational Choice Theorists Become Psychologists
In support of Rational Choice Theory, Judge Posner writes:
"Faced with anomalous behavior, the rational-choice economists
.... wracks his brains for some theoretical extension or modifica-
tion that will accommodate the seeming anomaly to the assump-
tion of rationality. From these efforts have come the advances in
economic theory listed in the preceding paragraph."190
Perhaps as an illustration of this point, earlier in that same
article, Judge Posner proposes a theoretical extension to accommo-
date a seeming anomaly to the assumption of rationality:
We can be torn between alternative courses of action because
of uncertainty. That poses no puzzle at all for rational-choice
theory. What does pose a puzzle is refusing to keep chocolate
in the house because of fear of not being able to overcome
temptation. Explaining such behavior in rational choice
terms may nevertheless be possible, but it may require aban-
doning a tacit assumption of most economic analysis-that
the self is a unity-in favor of a conception of the person as a
locus of different selves. All the selves are rational, but they
have inconsistent preferences. 191
Reading this passage, this writer found one of his own selves
pondering: "Wait a minute. Did I miss something here? Is this
still economics or have we entered the realm of psychology?" If
utility changes with our different selves, then what are we really
studying-economic factors or psychological factors? Though eclec-
ticism is to be admired, at what point does Rational Choice Theory
become so broad that it becomes or subsumes psychological theory?
And if it becomes psychological theory, are economists or quasi-
economists, with their lack of training or knowledge in the psycho-
logical domain (and somewhat less than perfect performance in
their own) the best qualified to study such phenomena or to pro-
mulgate and adjudicate public policy based on their unsupportable
assumptions regarding consumer behavior? 92
190. Posner, supra note 2, at 1567. The advances identified were: risk aver-
sion, risk preference, altruism, time preference, positive information costs and
strategic and habitual behavior.
191. Id. at 1555.
192. According to one anonymous wag: "An economist is an expert who will
know tomorrow why the things he predicted yesterday did not happen today." So
as to be fair to all involved, this author, an experimental social psychologist by
training, wishes to note that another wag defined psychology as "the study of the
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Think of the situation this way. Suppose two facts: the reader
was in need. of brain surgery and Albert Einstein was alive and
well today. If Einstein had no formal training or experience in
brain surgery, would you want this brilliant physicist performing
the operation? As it would not be rational, I suspect not. No mat-
ter how brilliant the economist, does it really make sense having
laws passed and adjudicated based on conceptually flawed and em-
pirically unsupported views of human consumer behavior? I sus-
pect not, as this would amount to the essence of what the Supreme
Court's decisions in regard to junk science1 93 are specifically de-
signed to prevent.
When asked how he managed to arrive at such brilliant ideas,
Einstein is reported to have said: "By standing on the shoulders of
those who came before me." If, when operating as a Rational
Choice Theorist, Judge Posner is going to introduce hypotheses re-
garding different selves, he might find it worthwhile to consult the
pertinent scholarly literature.194
I. Mea Culpa Coda
Those who read the criticisms of Rational Choice Theory of-
fered here may point out that, as this author acknowledged at the
outset, he did not recall awareness of the terms Law and Econom-
ics or Rational Choice Theory prior to being invited to provide con-
sumer psychological perspective on these subjects, and makes no
claim to being as conversant on these subjects as he would like. 195
As a consequence of our limited and imperfect understanding, we
may even have caricatured some of the positions held by Rational
Choice Theorists. From this, some may argue that, by this au-
thor's own admission, he has a limited and imperfect understand-
ing of the vast body of pertinent literature in Law and Economics.
Id by the odd." Also amusing is Ambrose Bierce's definition of "lawful" and Henry
L. Menken's description of judges, both of which are quoted by Judge Posner. See
Posner, supra note 3, at 25, 32.
193. See generally Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); General
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 552 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993) (discussing the admissibility into evidence of various scientific
techniques).
194. See generally Roy F. Baumeister, The Self, in 1 The Handbook of Social
Psychology, 680-740 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al., eds., 4th ed. 1998) (1954) (reviewing
the Rational Choice Theory as depicted in some scholarly literature).
195. See supra pp. 83-85.
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Hence, his criticisms must be considered naive and misguided and
deserve to be ignored.
In response, we acknowledge that those who offer such an ar-
gument may be correct. But would not the very same argument
apply to Rational Choice Theorists who, on the basis of limited and
demonstrably imperfect understanding (e.g., of experimental
methodology 196 ), dismiss what behavioral scientists have to offer?
The bottom line is this: Just as it would behoove this writer to
learn more about Rational Choice Theory (as it might cause him to
revise and possibly retract at least some of his criticisms), it would
seem equally appropriate for Rational Choice Theorists to learn
more about what behavioral science has to offer before dismissing
these findings as, at best, bothersome "quirks." Below, we offer a
few additional suggestions.
III. SoME (RATIONAL) SUGGESTIONS FOR RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORISTS
Given that the "end" sought by Rational Choice Theorists is to
acquire genuine (rather than illusory or spurious) understanding
of the causal dynamics underlying their predictions, then we have
some suggestions as to what, ex ante, might represent rational
means for closing in on this objective.
Based upon comments sprinkled throughout The Problems of
Jurisprudence, it is clear that Judge Posner appreciates employing
a scientific orientation. Moreover, of all the sciences, he seems to
most admire physics. "One could perhaps imagine law on the
model of a science-say, physics."197 From the sentence: "The pro-
196. As noted earlier, Judge Posner is mistaken when he represents that the
first question an experimenter would ask pertains to external validity, and is mis-
taken when he expresses the view that experiments necessarily require one to sup-
press features of the natural environment. Judge Posner is mistaken when he
fails to recognize that what he describes as "a whole other survey" is actually the
control group of a tightly controlled field experiment (cf. Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v.
Metropolitan Football Club Ltd. P'ship and Canadian Football League, 34 F.3d
410, 414 (7th Cir. 1994)). In that same matter, Judge Posner opined that it would
have been less "loaded" had the control shirts not substituted "Horses" for "Colts"
but used some other generic animal name such as "Leopards." See id. at 415. This
suggestion not only fails to appreciate how strange it would be to have the term
Leopards appear immediately above a 12" x 10" illustration of a horse head, but
that adopting such an approach would have rendered the findings regarding the
alleged causal relationship ambiguous and uninterpretable.
197. Posner, supra note 3, at 62.
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ject of reducing the common law ... to a handful of mathematical
formulas may seem quixotic, but the economic analyst can give
reasons for doubting this assessment," 198 we infer that one thing
Judge Posner appreciates about physics is the fact that its knowl-
edge may be expressed via powerful and parsimonious mathemati-
cal formulae.
Using physics (along with its mathematical sophistication) as
an aspirational model for law or rational choice economics is un-
derstandable. Across the sciences, it would be difficult to find a
more famous mathematical formula than Einstein's E=MC2 . Just
as Einstein's theory of relativity, though consisting of but three
variables, is exceedingly powerful, our reading suggests that Ra-
tional Choice Theorists seek to emulate physics by developing their
own grand but parsimonious theory, also consisting of a few power-
ful variables. Consider Becker's three-point formulation, which he
contends explains "all human behavior." 199 As another example,
consider Judge Posner's contention that "all people . . . in all of
their activities ... that involve choice"2°° (which pretty much in-
corporates most human behavior of consequence) are rational
maximizers.
Describing the differences in research philosophy between eco-
nomics and psychology, Katona wrote as follows:
The underlying posture of economics, over the past 100 or 200
years, may be characterized as starting with a well-developed
theory or an a priori model of human nature. Derivations
from the theory of rational behavior are confronted with em-
pirical data and modified stepwise if necessary. When, as fre-
quently happens, forecasts derived from the theory proved
incorrect, the specification of relationships or the failure to
include some additional objective factors were blamed and
subjective factors ignored.
The paradigm of the behavioral sciences consists of de-
veloping low-level preliminary hypotheses, testing them, re-
vising the hypotheses as the result of the tests, testing the
new hypotheses, and so on. Instead of deriving predictions
from immutable principles of human nature, the behavioral
scientist assumes that under conditions a,, bi, cl, a set of
stimuli would elicit one response whereas under conditions
198. Id. at 361.
199. See Jolls et al., supra note 28.
200. Posner, supra note 3, at 353.
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a2, b2, c2, the same set of stimuli would elicit a different re-
sponse .... Instead of searching for a single necessary re-
sponse to changes in income, prices or interest rates, the
behavioral scientist studies circumstances under which a
stimulus will produce the same or a different response.201
The reason behavioral scientist tend to begin with low-level
preliminary hypotheses, testing and refining these, then integrat-
ing them into larger units, testing and refining these, and so forth,
is because they generally operate using the following implicit
equation:
B = f ( ........................................ etc.).
According to this equation, human behavior (B) is a function of a
large number of complex, interacting variables, many of which (es-
pecially the intra-psychological states and processes) are hidden
from direct view. Particularly at this early time in its develop-
ment, it is only possible for behavioral science researchers to study
relatively few of these pertinent variables at a time. Thus, empiri-
cal psychologists, sociologists, communication theorists, etc. gener-
ally develop and test limited-in-scope mini-theories. When
formulated, their equations take the form of specifying a particular
aspect of human behavior to the left of the equal sign, then identi-
fying a handful of specific variables hypothesized to cause (or at
least influence) that behavior to the right of the equal sign.
Reliance on mini-theories is reinforced by an emphasis on ex-
planation (which requires experimental and quasi-experimental
methods to assess putative causal relationships) in preference to
an emphasis on mere prediction (which can rely on correlational
methods). Most behavioral scientists appear content (at least for
the moment) to develop, test and attempt to validate low-level the-
ories rather than develop and then weakly test (i.e., via correla-
tional designs) much grander theories whose causal propositions
cannot possibly be validated or invalidated. Mini-theories that fail
to be supported fall by the wayside. As more is learned and con-
firmed, the validated mini-theories that remain will be integrated
into larger mosaics-a process previously reflected in the develop-
ment of the physical sciences.
201. Katona I, supra note 14, at 1-2.
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Note that behavioral scientists in general, including this au-
thor,20 2 are not adverse to developing mathematical formulae to
model, describe and evaluate, among other things, human informa-
tion processing, decision-making and behavior. Examination of
scholarly journals across the behavioral sciences reveals many
such instances. But regardless of how sophisticated or complex,
this writer does not recall ever coming across a single mathemati-
cal formula that claimed to encompass or address all human be-
havior. In contrast, we consider the suggestion that all human
behavior may be explained by a few rudimentary concepts or may
be reducible to "a handful of mathematical formulas" to reflect a
considerable degree of naivete regarding the human condition.
Though the physical sciences have generated impressive levels
of understanding regarding the world around us, it remains true
that nuclear particles have no minds of their own. Human beings
do-and this makes all the difference. Because of this, at least at
this stage in the development of the behavioral sciences, no grand
theory is possible (unless, of course, one is willing to accept a the-
ory that, while it may have some predictive power, does not depend
on valid, empirically confirmed causal explanations).
When describing the sciences, a distinction traditionally made
is between the "hard" and "soft" sciences, e.g., between physics and
psychology, respectively. Although not as well known as this "hard
v. soft" distinction, Daniel Suits, an economist, draws a distinction
between the "hard" v. the "easy" sciences.20 3 According to Suits,
because the phenomena they examine are amenable to description
via crisp, parsimonious formulae, sciences such as physics and
chemistry are relatively "easy" sciences. On the other hand, be-
cause they deal with the inner workings of complex minds, psy-
chology, sociology and the other behavioral sciences truly are the
"hard" sciences.
When Rational Choice Theorists deal with matters such as fi-
nancial currencies, securities evaluation, interest rates and the
202. See, e.g., Jacob Jacoby et al., Attitude Formation as a Function of Incre-
mental Information Input: A Procedure For Studying On-Line Processing Models of
Attitude Formation, J. Consumer Psychol (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with
author); Gita V. Johar et al., A Varying Parameter Averaging Model of On-Line
Brand Evaluations, 24 J. Consumer Res. 232-47 (1997) (using these types of math-
ematical formulas); Jacob Jacoby et al., Tracing the Impact of Item-by-Item Infor-
mation Accessing Uncertainty Reduction, 21 J. Consumer Res. 291 (1994).
203. See Earl R. Babbie, Survey Research Methods 50 (1973).
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like, they are working with phenomena that have no minds.
Hence, they can afford to adopt a "behaviorist" approach. How-
ever, they should remain mindful that the concepts and ap-
proaches they develop and profitably employ in those spheres
might not be infinitely elastic. To this writer, it seems as if these
concepts and approaches snap when used to understand causal dy-
namics involving the human psyche. In realms such as the latter,
we suggest that Rational Choice Theorists forego their quest for a
grand equation the equivalent of an E=MC2 . Assuming an interest
in acquiring genuine understanding (as exemplified by explana-
tion, not mere prediction of causal factors), Rational Choice Theo-
rists are well-advised to try a bottom-up approach by developing
falsifiable mini-theories theories, then testing these utilizing ex-
perimental (including quasi-experimental) designs. 20 4 Via such
means, we suspect progress will be one inevitable result.
CONCLUSION
Admittedly, each of the other behavioral sciences has its own
(possibly even more serious) problems. But identifying and dis-
cussing these was not our present charge. Rather, it was to offer
some consumer psychological perspectives on Rational Choice
Theory.
In reviewing Paul Ormerod's book, "Butterfly Economics," an
Associate economics editor of Business Week writes: "Ormerod is on
to something. Too many economists still waste their time on tiny
tweaks and elaborations of orthodox economic models that are sim-
ply wrong ..... Economists who stick to linear models because
they are more tractable are like drunks who look for their car keys
under the street lamp because the light is better there."20 5 To
some extent, we believe this describes the current state affairs ex-
isting with regard to Rational Choice Theory. Being a bit pre-
sumptuous (as is our nature), to rectify the situation, we suggest
that Rational Choice Theorists (1) identify and attempt to verify
their assumptions, (2) acquire a more detailed understanding of
204. See Gunduz Caginalp et al., Overreactions, Momentum, Liquidity and
Price Bubbles in Laboratory and Field Asset Markets, 1 J. Psychol. & Fin. Markets
24 (2000) (illustrating the application of experimental designs to financial issues).
205. Peter Coy, Is the Dismal Science Dazed and Confused?, Bus. Wk., Jan. 24,
2000, at 24, reviewing Paul Ormerod, Butterfly Economics: A New General Theory
of Social and Economic Behavior (1998).
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pertinent behavior science theory and research findings, (3) try de-
veloping more testable (and falsifiable) mini-theories, and (4)
where possible, seek to apply experimental designs to supplement
their correlational designs. This could not hurt. In the long run, it
may prove exceedingly rational.
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APPENDIX
FIGURE 1
THE GENERAL BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE (S-O-R) MODEL
TIME ORGANISM
T, -- STIMULUS, a PAST EXPERIENCE ' RESPONSE,
MOTIVES
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2. Motives may be in conflict with one another
3. Same motive can lead to different behaviors (Across differ-
ent individuals; for the same individual, across time)
4. Different motives can lead to the same behavior (Across dif-
ferent individuals; for the same individual, across time)
5. Behavior is Multi-Determined (B = f[Motives + a wide vari-
ety of other factors])
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FIGURE 3
THE GENERAL COMMUNICATION MODEL AND A TYPICAL
HIERARCKY OF EFFECTS MODEL
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